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The Lost Lessons of Shareholder
Derivative Suits
Jessica Erickson *

Abstract
Merger litigation has changed dramatically. Today, nearly
every announcement of a significant merger sparks litigation,
and these cases look quite different from merger cases in the past.
These cases are now filed primarily outside of Delaware, they
typically settle without shareholders receiving any financial
consideration, and corporate boards now have far more ex ante
power to shape these cases. Although these changes are often
heralded as unprecedented, they are not. Over the past several
decades, derivative suits experienced many of the same changes.
This Article explores the similarities between the recent changes
in merger litigation and the longer history of derivative suits.
The trajectories of these lawsuits are not identical, but they
nonetheless suggest larger lessons about shareholder litigation,
including the predictable ways in which agency costs play out in
the courtroom and at the settlement table. By uncovering the lost
lessons of derivative suits, corporate law can finally tackle the
deeper issues facing shareholder litigation.

*
Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., Amherst
College; J.D., Harvard Law School. This paper benefitted from comments
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I.

Introduction

Merger litigation has changed in unprecedented ways. Just
fifteen years ago, it was relatively rare for shareholders to file
class actions to challenge mergers and acquisitions. 1 Today,
these suits are ubiquitous, 2 and they look different than they
ever did in the past. The settlements in these suits have
changed. Shareholders no longer receive any money from most
1. See Matthew D. Cain et al., Essay, The Shifting Tides of Merger
Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 621 tbl.1 (2018) (presenting data illustrating
that, in 2005, only thirty-seven percent of mergers involving U.S. public
companies with a transaction size of at least $100 million were challenged in
court).
2. See id. (stating that 85 percent of mergers meeting this definition
were challenged in 2017).
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settlements of these cases, with most instead involving
additional disclosures that are of little value. 3 The forums have
changed. Merger cases used to be filed in Delaware and other
state courts, 4 but they fled to federal court after Delaware
started to crack down on them. 5 And the power of corporate
boards has changed. Delaware now gives corporate boards
enhanced powers to control these suits through the adoption of
procedural rules in corporations’ governing documents. 6
Corporate law has never seen anything like this.
Except that it has. Decades before these transformations
began in merger litigation, derivative suits experienced many of
these same changes. 7 Indeed, the similarities between the
history of derivative suits and the more recent changes in
merger litigation are striking. In derivative suits, for example,
as in merger litigation, the case rarely ends with the plaintiff
receiving any money as part of the settlement. 8 Instead,
nonmonetary settlements where the corporation promises to
make certain corporate governance reforms are far more
common. 9 Similarly, just like in merger litigation, derivative
suits used to be filed primarily in state court, 10 but they are now
more commonly filed in federal court. 11 And just as Delaware
3. See id. at 623 tbl.3 (finding that 90 percent of merger settlements in
2017 were disclosure-only).
4. See id. at 621 tbl.1 (illustrating that only 7 percent of merger cases in
2005 were filed in federal court).
5. See id. (highlighting that 87 percent of merger cases in 2017 were
filed in federal court).
6. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559 (Del.
2014) (declaring that the boards of Delaware corporations can include new
procedural rules to govern fiduciary duty claims filed by their shareholders as
long as these rules were adopted “for a proper purpose”).
7. See generally Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the
Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010)
[hereinafter Erickson I] (presenting an empirical examination of shareholder
derivative suits in the federal courts).
8. See id. at 1754 (“Remarkably few of the [derivative] suits in my study
ended with the corporation receiving a meaningful financial benefit.”).
9. See id. at 1754–55 (explaining that modern settlement agreements
often lack recompense but instead include certain actions that must be
completed by the board).
10. See infra Part III.B.2.
11. See infra Part III.B.2.
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now gives corporate boards more power to rein in merger
litigation, Delaware has long given corporate boards the power
to limit derivative suits, through both the demand requirement
and special litigation committees. 12 When it comes to
shareholder litigation, history is repeating itself.
The irony is that few have noticed. Scholars have long noted
the common entrepreneurial roots of different types of
shareholder litigation, 13 but these suits are otherwise analyzed
within their own silos. 14 As a result, as merger litigation
changed dramatically, few recognized the similarities to the
earlier history of derivative suits.
These similarities matter because they reveal larger
lessons about shareholder litigation. First, the similarities
illustrate that the disclosure-only settlements in merger
settlements are not a wholly new development. They are instead
a variation on the nonmonetary settlements that have long been
common in corporate law. 15 Viewed as a whole, these
settlements illustrate how the agency costs inherent in
representative litigation can impact negotiations at the
settlement table. 16 Recognizing the common features of
nonmonetary settlements in these different types of cases will

12. See infra Part III.C.2.
13. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’
Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (“[P]laintiffs’
class and derivative attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear
a substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise nearly plenary control
over all important decisions in the lawsuit.”).
14. Compare Cain et al., supra note 1, at 610–30 (analyzing data on
merger class actions), with Erickson, supra note 7, at 1760–80 (analyzing data
on derivative suits). Indeed, the more recent articles discussing both types of
litigation focus on their differences. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Correcting
Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine
on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 47 (2015) (“Corporate benefit should be returned to
its doctrinal origins—the derivative suit—and no longer recognized as a
justification for fee awards in the class action context.”).
15. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
16. See Jessica Erickson, The Gatekeepers of Shareholder Litigation, 70
OKLA. L. REV. 237, 243–45 (2017) [hereinafter Erickson II] (explaining the risk
of attorneys and defendants settling to benefit themselves at the expense of
the shareholders).
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also make it easier to recognize whatever variation of these
settlements appears in the future. 17
Second, the similarities demonstrate the limitations of
relying on any one court to police shareholder lawsuits. The
Delaware Court of Chancery has played a key role in overseeing
shareholder litigation, helping to ensure that shareholders can
hold corporate managers accountable for their misdeeds in court
while keeping the agency costs of these suits in check. 18 Yet, in
both merger litigation and derivative suits, shareholders left the
Delaware Court of Chancery for federal court, at least in part to
avoid the scrutiny of Delaware judges. 19 This forum shopping
illustrates that Delaware alone cannot solve the problems with
shareholder litigation.
Finally, the similarities expose the dangers of relying on
corporate boards to oversee shareholder lawsuits. Given the
bedrock principle that corporate boards oversee the business
and affairs of corporations, 20 it is not surprising that courts have
looked for ways to allow boards to exercise oversight over
shareholder lawsuits, either through the adoption of new rules
to govern these suits in corporate bylaws and charters or
through procedures such as the demand requirement and
special litigation committees (SLC). 21 Yet the legal system has
never fully grappled with the conflicts of interests that arise
when directors’ power extends to claims that may someday be
filed against them. 22
17. See infra Part IV.A.
18. See E. Norman Veasey & Michael P. Dooley, The Role of Corporate
Litigation in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131, 141 (2000)
(“For the past 100 years, [Delaware] has been the laboratory where our most
fundamental concepts of corporate governance have been developed and
refined.”).
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019) (“The business and affairs
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of the board of directors . . . .”).
21. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) (stating
that the purpose of the demand requirement is to allow the board to adjudge
whether a derivative suit would be detrimental to the company).
22. Cf. Amy Simmerman, Brad Sorrels & Lori Will, Year in Review:
Delaware Corporate Law and Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
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This Article examines the lost lessons of shareholder
litigation by analyzing the similar evolution of merger litigation
and derivative suits. Part II explores how these lawsuits appear
to be quite different, despite their common entrepreneurial
roots. Part III then turns to the hidden similarities between
these lawsuits, examining their common experiences with
nonmonetary settlements, forum shopping, and director
oversight. Part IV steps back and analyzes the broader lessons
from these similarities.
To be clear, the point of this Article is not that these
different types of shareholder litigation have followed identical
trajectories. There are a number of important differences. The
rise of merger litigation, for example, was quite sudden as was
its later flight to federal court, 23 while derivative suits evolved
more slowly and without nearly as much public attention. 24
These suits also address different types of misconduct and are
brought on behalf of different parties, 25 so the comparison can
only go so far. Yet by stepping back and analyzing their
similarities, we can glean broader insight into the lost lessons
of shareholder litigation.
II.

The Different Paths of Shareholder Litigation

Corporate law has long offered shareholders a variety of
litigation options to police the behavior of corporate managers. 26
These lawsuits are typically representative suits—derivative
suits, for example, are filed on behalf of plaintiff corporations,
while merger lawsuits are filed on behalf of a shareholder
class. 27 The representative nature of these suits means that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys have more power than in typical litigation,
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/2565-EYSU (critiquing the
traditional efficacy of SLCs while also noting that the Court of Chancery has
recently shifted from a trend of deference to allowing some plaintiffs to proceed
depending on the severity of the underlying complaint).
23. See infra Parts II.B, III.B.
24. See infra Parts II.B, III.B.
25. See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
26. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 237–38 (listing the various ways
shareholders can redress corporate misconduct).
27. See id. at 241 (discussing shareholder lawsuits).
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which can lead to abuses. 28 This Part first examines the common
entrepreneurial roots of derivative suits and merger litigation
before turning to how these similarities have nonetheless led to
very different historical trajectories for the two types of
lawsuits.
A.

Common Entrepreneurial Roots

Shareholder derivative suits address different types of
corporate governance challenges, which can easily mask their
similarities. Shareholder derivative suits are brought on behalf
of a plaintiff corporation, 29 and any recovery from the litigation
goes to the corporation itself, rather than to the shareholders. 30
In contrast, merger lawsuits are typically class actions, 31 with
one or more shareholders filing the litigation on behalf of a class
of shareholders. 32 Any recovery from these lawsuits goes
directly to the shareholders. 33
Despite these differences, however, derivative suits and
merger litigation share common entrepreneurial roots that
distinguish them from traditional civil litigation. In most civil
cases, the parties have a direct financial interest in the
28. See id. at 242–45 (explaining the possible abuses of plaintiffs’
attorneys in shareholder lawsuits).
29. See John Matheson, Restoring the Promise of the Shareholder
Derivative Suit, 50 GA. L. REV. 327, 344 (2016) (“A derivative action allows
shareholders to bring a suit against directors or officers in the name of the
corporation itself.”).
30. See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of
Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 81 (2008) [hereinafter
Erickson III] (“Any recovery in a derivative suit is returned to the
corporation.”).
31. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of
Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV.
133, 135 (2004) [hereinafter Thompson & Thomas I] (describing this category
of litigation as “class action lawsuits filed under state law challenging director
conduct in mergers and acquisitions”).
32. See Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A. Rickey, Objections to Disclosure
Settlements: A How-to Guide, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 281, 292 (2017) (discussing the
definition of the settlement class in merger lawsuits).
33. Cf. Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in
Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX.
L. REV. 557, 566 (2015) (referring to the slim likelihood that the plaintiff class
will recover money in a merger lawsuit).
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litigation because their money is on the line. 34 As a result, they
have an incentive to monitor their attorney and make sure that
the attorney is acting in their best interest. 35 This incentive to
monitor allows the legal system to take a more hands off
approach to these cases, respecting the parties’ decisions
regarding the course of the litigation as long as they comply with
generally applicable rules. 36
Shareholder
litigation,
however,
is
primarily
representative litigation, which means that the true parties in
interest do not control the litigation. 37 Instead, one or more
shareholder plaintiffs represent the corporation or a broader
class of shareholders. 38 In theory, these representative plaintiffs
should monitor the litigation, ensuring that their attorneys act
in the best interest of the true parties in interest. 39 Yet
representative plaintiffs only receive their pro rata share of any

34. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 241 (“[In most cases,] a client can
monitor his or her attorney’s decisions, questioning those that do not appear
to be in the client’s best interests and ultimately firing the attorney if the
client’s wishes are not followed.”); Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89
WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 390 (2011) (“Unlike individual private cases, like a
contract dispute, aggregate and derivative parties cannot simply settle the
case and dismiss their claims.”).
35. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 241 (“Whether the case is a
multi-million dollar securities class action or a run-of-the-mill negligence case,
there is always a concern that a lawyer will act in his or her own best interests
rather than in the interests of the client.”).
36. See id. (providing a practical example of how agency costs are reduced
in certain classes of lawsuits).
37. See Thompson & Thomas I, supra note 31, at 148 (highlighting that
representative litigation spreads risk across individual shareholders therefore
lessening the marginal benefit for additional cost of monitoring attorneys).
38. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS:
LAW & PRACTICE § 1:1 (2020)
A derivative suit differs in a fundamental respect from a class
action brought by a corporation’s shareholders. Both are
representative actions, but the claims asserted in a derivative suit
are those of the corporation, while the claims asserted in a class
action are individual claims of injury suffered by the shareholders
themselves.
39. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 241 (explaining that, in more
traditional litigation, plaintiff’s take a more active role in monitoring their
attorneys).
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settlement in a class action. 40 In a derivative suit, their financial
stake is even more attenuated because any recovery goes to the
corporation and therefore the corporation’s shareholders only
benefit indirectly from the litigation. 41 As a result, in both
merger litigation and derivative suits, representative plaintiffs
often do not have sufficient financial interest to effectively
monitor their attorneys. 42
This financial reality leads to plaintiffs’ attorneys often
having a far greater investment in the litigation than the
representative plaintiffs. 43 This investment means that the
attorneys typically control the litigation, with the
representative plaintiff serving only a nominal role. In this way,
plaintiffs’ attorneys are like litigation entrepreneurs, deciding
what claims to file and making nearly all of the decisions related
to the litigation. 44 In the words of Professor John Coffee, the
reality is that “class actions and other representative
actions . . . are largely lawyer financed, lawyer controlled, and
lawyer settled, subject to generally weak client control and only
modest oversight by courts.” 45
This situation creates obvious and oft-discussed agency
costs. Without significant control by their clients, plaintiffs’
attorneys can make decisions that benefit themselves at the
40. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 701 (1986) (“[In a
derivative suit,] the recovery goes not to the shareholder plaintiff, but to the
corporation.”).
41. See id. (“[T]he actual plaintiffs benefit only to the extent of their pro
rata interest in the corporation.”).
42. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 242 (“The shareholder plaintiff
incurs all of the costs of monitoring the attorney, but receives only a fraction
of the benefits.”).
43. See Thompson & Thomas I, supra note 31, at 148 (“Plaintiffs’ lawyers
are the dominant players in representative shareholder litigation, whether
derivative actions, securities fraud class actions, or state acquisition-oriented
class actions.”).
44. See Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 3 (“[P]laintiffs’ class and
derivative attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a
substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise nearly plenary control
over all important decisions in the lawsuit.”).
45. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL,
AND FUTURE 5 (2015).

1140

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1131 (2020)

expense of these clients, acting more like principals than legal
agents or fiduciaries. These attorneys can, for example, make
trade-offs in settlement negotiations that leave more money in
their own pockets. 46 They can also choose to abandon
positive-value claims and put their resources into other cases
that offer higher possible payouts. 47
To be clear, these economic incentives do not always lead to
outcomes that are bad for shareholders. 48 In some cases,
representative plaintiffs have a significant financial stake in the
litigation and therefore greater incentives to monitor their
attorneys. 49 And just because these attorneys sometimes have
the ability to prioritize their own financial interest does not
mean that they will do so. Moral and ethical constraints will
often temper the financial conflicts in these cases. Nonetheless,
entrepreneurial litigation deviates from the traditional models
of litigation in ways that necessitate greater attention and
oversight. 50
B.

Different Historical Trajectories

Although derivative suits and merger litigation have
common entrepreneurial roots, they have had very different
46. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 242 (“[R]educed monitoring in
shareholder litigation can increase agency costs by allowing attorneys to seek
a higher percentage of the recovery for their fee.”).
47. See id. at 242–43 (providing a quantitative example of this principle
in action).
48. See Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using
Data Points of Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS.
LAW. 623, 623–26 (2017) (arguing that commentators need to remember “the
existence of a parallel universe of stockholder deal litigation that does not fit”
the traditional narrative about shareholder litigation); Jessica Erickson, The
(Un)changing Derivative Suit, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 58, 64 (Sean Griffith, et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter
Erickson IV] (“Shareholder derivative suits have shone in addressing
particular types of corporate misconduct, most recently the backdating of stock
options.”).
49. See generally James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff
Matter: An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (2006) (illustrating that lead institutional plaintiffs
often have significant stakes in the litigation).
50. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 245 (arguing for the implementation
of gatekeepers for shareholder litigation).
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historical trajectories. Derivative suits are one of the oldest
forms of shareholder litigation, recognized by courts as early as
1830. 51 In their early years, corporations were in favor of
derivative suits because they could use these suits to create
federal diversity jurisdiction and bring their business disputes
into federal court. 52 Even after courts put a stop to these tactics,
derivative suits flourished as the primary way that
shareholders could police corporate managers. 53 The Supreme
Court recognized the importance of these suits, stating in 1949
that they were the “chief regulator of corporate management.” 54
As these suits gained prominence, however, courts and
legislatures began to regulate them more heavily, concerned
that many derivative suits were strike suits brought primarily
for their nuisance value. 55 In the early to mid-1900s, several
states passed new legislation requiring shareholder plaintiffs to
post a substantial bond before filing suit unless they owned a
certain percentage of the corporation’s stock. 56 This procedural
hurdle was accompanied by others. Shareholder plaintiffs had
to establish, for example, that they owned shares in the plaintiff
51. See Matheson, supra note 29, at 341–42 (recounting the early history
of derivative suits in the United States and their initial analogy to trust law).
52. See Donna I. Dennis, Contrivance and Collusion: The Corporate
Origins of Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, 67 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 1479, 1486 (2015)
The first shareholder derivative suit to reach the U.S. Supreme
Court—the landmark 1856 case, Dodge v. Woolsey—arose from
circumstances in which corporate managers and their counsel
appear to have orchestrated a shareholder action to secure a result
that the corporate entity was unlikely to achieve in its own right.
53. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of
Representative Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional
Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1756 (2012) (“Derivative suits were the
dominant form of shareholder litigation for most of the twentieth century.”).
54. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
55. See id. (noting that these suits were “aptly characterized in
professional slang as ‘strike suits[,]’” that “were brought not to redress real
wrongs, but to realize upon their nuisance value.”).
56. See Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors
in Corporate Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 305
(2008) (“[Although derivative suits were initially lauded,] states soon began
focusing on their potential to be used as strike suit litigation, passing statutes
requiring plaintiffs in derivative actions to post bonds to insure that they could
pay corporate defendants’ attorneys’ fees and expenses in frivolous suits.”).
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corporation at the time of the alleged misconduct and continued
to hold this stock throughout the litigation. 57
States also gave corporate boards more control over these
suits. The core precept in corporate law is that boards of
directors, not shareholders, control corporations. 58 Given the
board’s broad powers, it would normally decide whether the
corporation should file a lawsuit. 59 Derivative suits are an
exception to this general rule because the defendants in
derivative suits typically include the corporation’s directors,
who cannot reasonably be expected to sue themselves. 60 Yet,
courts began to fashion ways for corporate boards to take back
control of derivative suits under certain circumstances. For
example, they required all shareholder plaintiffs to make a
demand on the corporation’s board of directors before filing suit,
with a limited exception in some jurisdictions if the shareholder
plaintiff could show that demand would be futile. 61 Later, states
began to allow boards to form special litigation committees that
could review the allegations in the litigation and to petition the
court to dismiss the suit if the committee determined that the
suit was not in the best interests of the corporation. 62
57. See J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership
Requirement, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 673 (2008) (critiquing the
contemporaneous ownership requirement as incoherent and arbitrary).
58. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019) (vesting corporate power
with the board of directors).
59. See, e.g., Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1115–16 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(“[Although i]t is black-letter law that the board of directors of a Delaware
corporation exercises all corporate powers . . . [the law recognizes that]
directors and officers of a corporation may not hold themselves accountable to
the corporation for their own wrongdoing.”).
60. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability
Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 271 (1986) (“The derivative suit is a striking
exception to this fundamental principle of corporate law.”).
61. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and
Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1748–50 (2004)
[hereinafter Thompson & Thomas II] (“As a practical matter, plaintiffs never
make such a demand on the board, but rather plead that a demand would be
futile.”).
62. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 387, 401–02 (2008) [hereinafter Davis I] (discussing the case law
governing SLCs).
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These procedural hurdles were meant to screen out
frivolous derivative claims, but they did not fully accomplish
their goal. 63 Study after study cast doubt on the value of
derivative suits. Professor Roberta Romano published a
well-known study of derivative suits filed on behalf of public
companies in the 1980s and 1990s, finding that
“[s]hareholder-plaintiffs . . . have
abysmal
success
in
court . . . [and] the proportion of derivative suits with a cash
payout to shareholders (21 percent) is significantly lower than
that of class actions (67 percent).” 64 More common were
settlements in which the plaintiff corporation agreed to make
“cosmetic organizational change[s]” to its corporate governance
practices, which she hypothesized were primarily to justify the
award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel. 65 A study thirty
years later found that federal derivative suits followed a similar
pattern, with most settlements involving “corporate governance
reforms that are often untested and/or patently unhelpful for
both the corporations and their shareholders.” 66
Over time, battered by procedural hurdles and empirical
criticism, derivative suits largely faded from view. 67 Their
lackluster settlements rarely made the front pages of the
financial press. Securities class actions stepped in to address
many of the same types of claims that derivative suits had
traditionally addressed. 68 And the rise of institutional investors
meant that larger shareholders did not need to resort to
63. See Thomson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1791–92 (analyzing
whether Delaware should remove some of the obstacles to derivative
litigation).
64. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 60–61 (1991).
65. Id. at 63 (stating that “[a] likely explanation” for these settlements
“is the need to paper a record to justify an award of attorneys’ fees to courts”).
66. Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1830 (providing an empirical examination
of shareholder derivative suits in the federal courts).
67. See Erickson IV, supra note 48, at 58–65 (discussing the “deep and
systematic problems” with derivative suits).
68. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as
Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 861
(2003) (arguing that corporate governance outside of acquisitions and
self-dealing transactions “has passed to federal law and in particular to
shareholder litigation under Rule 10b-5”).
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litigation because they had the economic clout to make their
voices heard in the boardroom. 69 In this new world of corporate
governance, derivative suits play a minimal role in policing
corporate managers. 70 Today, when the scholarly literature
mentions derivative suits, it often characterizes them as
corporate law relics that are largely “dead” or “forgotten.” 71
Merger litigation has followed a very different historical
path. These suits are not new—shareholders have long been
able to file class actions to challenge mergers or acquisitions. 72
Until recently, however, they were relatively rare and
uncontroversial. A study of merger class actions in 1999 and
2000 found that only 10 percent of deals were challenged in
court. 73 They found that, on average, the takeover offers that
were challenged in court ended up with a substantially higher
premium than other offers. 74 In a related study, they found that
“large monetary settlements [were] paid to shareholders in
many of these cases [and] that these settlements involved a
substantially lower percentage level of attorneys’ fees as
69. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation
Committees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305,
1353–54 (2005) [hereinafter Davis II]
The ensuing years have seen boards and board committees with
larger numbers of more independent directors, activism by
institutional investors, private enforcement of the federal securities
laws, and white-collar criminal prosecution all emerge as powerful
deterrents to corporate misconduct.
70. See Thomas, supra note 56, at 305 (“Empirical studies show that
compared to federal securities class actions, or to state court
acquisition-oriented class actions, derivative suits are running a weak third in
terms of their importance to shareholders.”).
71. See Davis I, supra note 62, at 389 (referring to derivative suits as
“forgotten”); see also Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1749 n.6 (“Like
the proverbial cat, derivative suits have been pronounced dead on numerous
occasions . . . .”); Veasey & Dooley, supra note 18, at 142 (stating that
commentators have proclaimed derivative suits “dead and gone and buried”).
72. See Ann M. Scarlett, Shareholder Derivative Litigation’s Historical
and Normative Foundations, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 843 (2013) (“Examples of
representative litigation are found in the ‘earliest days of English law.’”
(citations omitted)).
73. See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1254 tbl.1 (2012) (reporting the statistics
from the study).
74. See id. at 1248.
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compared to securities fraud class actions.” 75 Overall, they
concluded that “we believe that acquisition-oriented class
actions substantially reduce management agency costs, while
the litigation agency costs they create do not appear
excessive.” 76
This rosy picture soon changed. Over the next several years,
the incidence of merger litigation increased dramatically. 77 By
2013, nearly all mergers and acquisitions were challenged in
court, often in multiple jurisdictions. 78 Even more troubling,
these cases rarely ended with shareholders receiving cash
payments or a higher merger premium. Instead, the settlements
often involved the corporation agreeing to disclose additional
information about the merger itself or the process that led up to
its approval by the target company’s board. 79 Empirical studies
cast doubt on the value of these disclosures. 80 In light of these
findings, nearly everyone agreed that “merger litigation [was]
fundamentally broken.” 81
Delaware took a number of steps to reform these cases and
protect its litigation franchise. Indeed, Vice Chancellor Slights
of the Delaware Court of Chancery stated in jest that his job had
become “pick[ing] up a club . . . and beating the cases over the
head.” 82 The court encouraged corporations to adopt forum
75. Thompson & Thomas I, supra note 31, at 138.
76. Id. at 140.
77. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The
Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 476
(2015) (highlighting that the rate of merger litigation increased from 39.5
percent in 2005 to 92.1 percent in 2011).
78. See id. (presenting data on the rise of multijurisdictional merger
litigation).
79. See Fisch et al., supra note 33, at 559 (“Although deal litigation is
pervasive, these lawsuits rarely result in a monetary recovery for the plaintiff
class. Rather, the vast majority end in settlement or dismissal. In most settled
cases, the only relief provided to shareholders consists of supplemental
disclosures in the merger proxy statement.”).
80. See id. at 562 (“[W]e find no support for the second hypothesis—that
is, disclosure-only settlements do not appear to affect shareholder voting in
any way.”).
81. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 610.
82. Matthew Diller & Joseph R. Slights III, Lecture, Corwin v. KKR
Financial Holdings LLC—An “After-Action Report,” 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 1, 18–19 (2018).
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selection clauses in their charters, ensuring that these suits
could only be brought in Delaware. 83 It announced that it would
reject any disclosure-only settlement that did not include
“‘plainly material’ disclosures.” 84 And it changed the
substantive standards of review by which it reviewed mergers
and acquisitions, giving more deference to deals that were
approved by independent and fully informed shareholders. 85
For a while, it looked like these reforms would work. The
percentage of deals challenged in court started to fall. 86 Soon,
however, plaintiffs’ attorneys changed their strategies to
circumvent these new hurdles. For example, they filed their
claims outside of Delaware where they could, either by suing
companies without forum selection clauses or by packaging
their claims as federal securities class actions, which are not
covered by many board-adopted forum selection clauses. 87 They
also circumvented judicial review of their deals with defendants
by casting these deals as mootness payments, rather than
formal settlements. 88 Today, according to the most recent data,
approximately 85 percent of mergers and acquisitions are
challenged in court, only slightly less than the high water mark
in 2013. 89 The market for merger litigation changed in response
to Delaware’s actions, but it definitely did not disappear.
As these brief histories reveal, derivative suits and merger
litigation have been on different historical trajectories for the
83. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch.
2010) (suggesting that judicial oversight would be more effective if counsel
included forum selection clauses).
84. In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 888–89 (Del. Ch. 2016).
85. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del.
2015) (stating that the business judgment rule is the correct standard of
review in post-closing damages actions); Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88
A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (holding that the deferential business judgment rule
is the proper standard of review for actions between controlling stockholders
and corporate subsidiaries in merger actions).
86. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 620 (examining the changes in types
of suits filed).
87. See id. at 628–29 (highlighting mechanisms by which litigants avoid
Delaware courts).
88. See id. at 629 (describing the use of mootness payments in
shareholder suits).
89. See id. at 620 (reporting data from the first ten months of 2017).
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last several decades. 90 Derivative suits were once the
cornerstone of corporate law, but faded under an array of
procedural hurdles that gave more power to corporate boards. 91
Merger litigation, in contrast, remains a dominant form of
corporate litigation, surviving a judicial assault that made no
pretense of its intention to target these suits. 92
These contrasting narratives create a perception that
derivative suits and merger litigation are fundamentally
different. Yes, they come from the same entrepreneurial roots
with the same basic incentives for the parties involved, but the
similarities end there. As we will see, however, there is a
different way of understanding this history. 93 These two forms
of litigation have more in common than it initially appears, and
these similarities provide an important lesson on the nature of
entrepreneurial litigation more broadly.
III. The Hidden Similarities
As the merger litigation crisis developed, it was largely
treated as a new and distinctive set of problems. 94 Courts and
scholars recognized that merger litigation typified the broader
and quite well-known problems of entrepreneurial litigation,
but the specific ways that these problems played out were seen
as unique. 95 The disclosure-only settlements in merger cases, for
example, were a new development, as was the trend of cases
filed in multiple jurisdictions that have now largely left
Delaware. 96 And one of the primary remedies proposed by
courts—board-adopted rules to replace the default procedural

90. Compare supra notes 51–71 and accompanying text, with supra notes
72–89 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 51–71 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 72–89 and accompanying text.
93. See infra Part III.
94. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 79–81, 83, 88 and accompanying text.
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rules that govern these cases—was also seen as a new step in
corporate law. 97
In some ways, these are indeed new developments that
reflect the specific contours of merger litigation. 98 Yet, viewed
through a broader lens, these developments bear a striking
resemblance to the changes that occurred in derivative suits
over the last several decades. 99 The disclosure-only settlements
in merger litigation look a lot like the nonmonetary settlements
that have long been common in derivative suits. 100 The pattern
of merger class actions leaving Delaware for other state and
federal courts looks a lot like the filing patterns of derivative
suits. 101 And the decision to give boards more power over these
cases harkens back to the power given to boards and
independent committees in derivative suits. 102 As we will see,
this resemblance is not accidental. The agency costs of
representative litigation often play out in predictable ways, and
recognizing these patterns provides a foundation for thinking
about how to prevent these problems in the future.
A.

Nonmonetary Settlements
1.

Merger Litigation

The rise of disclosure-only settlements set the stage for the
problems that arose in merger litigation. One prominent study
reported that approximately 80 percent of settlements in
merger class actions ended without the shareholder class
receiving any monetary consideration. 103 Instead, the only
consideration in these settlements was the defendant
97. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 258–59 (“Corporate law has long
allowed corporations to alter default rules in their charters and bylaws. It is
therefore surprising that it took corporations until recently to use this power
to address frivolous shareholder lawsuits.”).
98. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
99. See infra Part III.A.
100. See infra Part III.B.
101. See infra Part III.C.
102. See infra Part III.C.
103. See ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 6 (2013) (finding that these settlements
resulted in nothing more than supplemental disclosures).
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corporation’s agreement to make additional disclosures about
the merger. 104 The only people who received any money in these
cases were the lawyers. Courts regularly awarded plaintiffs’
attorneys a fee of $500,000 or more in these cases, 105 and
defense attorneys received whatever fee they privately
negotiated with their corporate clients. The shareholders,
however, rarely saw a dime. 106
For several years, however, courts appeared fine with this
status quo, routinely approving disclosure-only settlements. 107
After all, in theory, additional disclosures could offer value, 108
providing shareholders with more information about the key
terms of the merger and the process that led up to it. With this
possibility in mind, along with a strong preference for disposing
of cases on their dockets, courts permitted these settlements. 109
In doing so, courts pointed to the fact that Delaware had long
recognized the potential value of non-monetary relief in
litigation. 110
Over time, however, the situation became untenable. The
more courts approved these settlements, the more plaintiffs’
attorneys filed new cases until nearly every deal was subject to
litigation. 111 The final nail in the coffin was likely a 2015 study
concluding these additional disclosures had no significant

104. See id. (discussing the settlement terms in merger litigation).
105. See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136 (Del.
Ch. 2011) (“This Court has often awarded fees of approximately $400,000 to
$500,000 for one or two meaningful disclosures, such as previously withheld
projections or undisclosed conflicts faced by fiduciaries or their advisors.”).
106. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 103, at 9–10 (analyzing plaintiff
attorney fees in merger litigation).
107. See Fisch et al., supra note 33, at 572 (“In short, plaintiffs negotiate,
and courts approve, corrective disclosure in more than 60% of all
transactions.”).
108. See id. at 561 (acknowledging there may be some residual benefit to
these types of settlements).
109. See id. at 564–66 (discussing why courts in Delaware tended to accept
these settlements).
110. See id. at 566–67 (highlighting the enormous costs that flow from
allowing cases to proceed to trial).
111. See id. at 558–59 (emphasizing the increased frequency of merger
litigation).
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impact on the outcome of the shareholder vote. 112 In other
words, shareholders were not changing their minds as a result
of this new information, challenging the contention that these
disclosures were material and thus deserved judicial approval
and accompanying fees for the plaintiffs’ lawyers. 113
After months of hinting that change was afoot, 114 the
Delaware Court of Chancery put its foot down. In In re Trulia,
Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 115 the court stated that it would not
approve any disclosure-only settlement unless the disclosures
were “plainly material.” 116 The court rationalized this decision
by noting that “far too often such litigation serves no useful
purpose for stockholders.” 117 Instead, the court stated
[I]t serves only to generate fees for certain lawyers who are
regular players in the enterprise of routinely filing hastily
drafted complaints on behalf of stockholders on the heels of
the public announcement of a deal and settling quickly on
terms that yield no monetary compensation to the
stockholders they represent. 118

This decision was a landmark ruling in Delaware, setting off a
chain of similar decisions rejecting disclosure-only
settlements. 119
112. See id. at 559 (reporting the study’s results).
113. See id. (“If disclosure settlements do not affect shareholder voting, it
is difficult to argue that they benefit shareholders.”).
114. See generally, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Acevedo v.
Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730-VCL, 2015 WL 4127547 (Del. Ch. July 8,
2015) (rejecting a settlement that included modest changes to the deal terms
and additional disclosures in exchange for a broad release and $800,000 in
attorneys’ fees); In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No.
10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 241 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (approving a
disclosure-only settlement, but with the warning that going forward the court
would scrutinize these settlements far more carefully).
115. 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
116. Id. at 898–99.
117. Id. at 891–92.
118. Id. at 892.
119. See, e.g., Order & Statement of Reasons at 6, Vergiev v. Aguero, No.
L-2276-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 2016) (rejecting settlement and
adopting Trulia into New Jersey law); Bushansky v. All. Fiber Optics Prods.,
Inc., No. 16-CV-294245, slip op. at 7–9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2017)
(adopting Trulia standard into California law); Griffith v. Quality Distrib.,
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For those who follow Delaware’s corporate law
jurisprudence, this narrative is well-known. It is often told in
the same familiar way. Disclosure-only settlements became
common, contributing to the proliferation of merger litigation,
until Delaware finally addressed the problem in Trulia. 120 Yet
this version of the narrative—a version in which merger
litigation had sui generis settlement terms, leading to a sui
generis judicial response—ignores the broader history of
nonmonetary settlements.
2.

Derivative Suits

Nonmonetary settlements have been common in derivative
suits for decades. In her landmark study, Professor Roberta
Romano surveyed shareholder lawsuits filed between the late
1960s and 1987. 121 She found that the percentage of derivative
suits in her study that ended with a monetary settlement was
far lower than the percentage of shareholder class actions. 122
She also found, however, that a significant number of
settlements included corporate governance reforms, rather than
cash consideration. 123 In several of the settlements, for example,
the plaintiff corporation agreed to change the composition of its
board; in others, the corporation agreed to change its policies on
executive compensation or self-interested transactions. 124
Romano did not delve deeply into the merits of these reforms,
but she did state that “while it is impossible to value the benefits
from structural settlements with any precision, the gains seem
inconsequential.” 125

Inc., No. 2D17-3160, slip op. at 13–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 13, 2018)
(adopting Trulia standard into Florida law).
120. There is more to the story, as we will see in subsequent sections. See
infra Part III.B.
121. Romano, supra note 64, at 56.
122. Id. at 61 (“The proportion of derivative suits with a cash payment to
shareholders (21 percent) is significantly lower than that of class actions (67
percent).”).
123. Id. at 63.
124. See id. (examining the nature of self-interested transactions).
125. Id.
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These nonmonetary settlements continued over the next
few decades. A study of derivative suits filed in 2006 and 2007
found that the vast majority of settlements included some form
of nonmonetary relief. 126 As in the Romano study, this
nonmonetary relief was typically a promise by the plaintiff
corporation to adopt corporate governance reforms. 127 This
study looked at the particular reforms in these settlements,
drawing on business and finance literature to conclude that
these reforms were unlikely to benefit corporations or their
shareholders. 128
Despite this empirical evidence, Delaware has routinely
approved these nonmonetary settlements in derivative suits. In
Ryan v. Gifford, 129 for example, the court stated that “[i]t is
difficult to place a value on such non-pecuniary benefits;
however, such governance reforms can provide substantial
benefits and are appropriately considered by the Court when
evaluating a proposed settlement.” 130 And in one of the most
famous cases in corporate law, the Delaware Court of Chancery
approved a settlement of an oversight case even while
recognizing that “the changes in corporate practice that are
presented as consideration for the settlement do not impress one
as very significant.” 131 This history suggests that Delaware’s lax
scrutiny of nonmonetary settlements in derivative suits, despite
the empirical evidence casting significant doubt on the value of
these settlements, may have opened the door for plaintiffs’
attorneys to try similar tactics in merger litigation.
This history puts the rise of disclosure-only settlements in
merger litigation in a new light. These settlements were not a
historical anomaly that Delaware was unexpectedly forced to
126. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1798–99 (finding that 85 percent of
the derivative suit settlements included some type of corporate governance
reform).
127. See id. at 1804–05 (listing the reforms involved in the settlements).
128. See id. at 1807–29 (analyzing the effects of purported reforms).
129. No. 2213-CC, 2009 WL 18143 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2009).
130. Id. at *10.
131. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (noting also that the settlement agreement included a requirement
that the plaintiff-corporation create a new compliance committee even though
the corporation already had such a committee).
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confront in 2016. Rather, these settlements were an extension
of a much longer history of nonmonetary settlements in
shareholder litigation. Given this history, Delaware should not
have been taken aback by the rise of these settlements in
merger cases, nor should it have taken so long for courts to step
in.
It is not surprising that nonmonetary settlements were
used in both merger and derivative lawsuits because these
lawsuits have the same underlying incentives that make these
settlements so appealing. As discussed in Part I, there is a
well-recognized conflict of interest between plaintiffs’ attorneys
and the shareholders they are supposed to represent. 132
Shareholders (or the plaintiff corporation in a derivative suit)
want to maximize their recovery from the litigation, while
plaintiffs’ attorneys had an added desire to maximize their own
fees. 133 In theory, representative shareholders should monitor
the attorneys to ensure that they are watching out for the
interests of the class or the plaintiff corporation. Yet these
shareholders typically do not have a large enough financial
stake in the case to make this type of monitoring a worthwhile
investment. 134
This conflict opens the door to nonmonetary settlements.
Given the lax monitoring by shareholders, plaintiffs’ attorneys
can trade greater fees for themselves in exchange for reduced,
or even no, financial consideration in the settlement itself. 135 If
the attorneys bargain for a $1 million settlement, they might
receive $300,000 in fees. If they can shift the consideration so
the plaintiffs only receive the promise of corporate governance
reforms or additional disclosures, they might be able to bargain
for $500,000 in fees for themselves. Of course, many attorneys
have strong ethical commitments that keep them from trading
their clients’ settlement leverage for their own, but the fact
132. See supra Part II.A.
133. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 241–43 (discussing the
“mismatched incentives” of shareholder-plaintiffs and their attorneys).
134. See id. at 241–42 (stating that shareholder-plaintiffs lack the
necessary incentives to properly monitor their attorneys).
135. See id. at 242 (“[R]educed monitoring in shareholder litigation can
increase agency costs by allowing attorneys to seek a higher percentage of the
recovery for their fee.”).
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remains that nonmonetary settlements permit this type of
trade-off.
As the above example demonstrates, these settlements are
also a financial windfall for the defendants. Most settlements
are zero-sum, which means that every dollar that goes to the
plaintiffs is a dollar that comes out of the defendants’ pocket. 136
In nonmonetary settlements, however, defendants can get out
of litigation cheaply by only paying the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.
Defendants do not care about the allocation of money between
the attorneys and plaintiffs; they only want to reduce their total
financial outlay. 137 As a result, everyone at the settlement table
is happy to trade nonmonetary consideration for monetary
consideration, as long as the judge and the representative
shareholders do not object (and they typically do not). 138
These same incentives exist in other types of class actions
as well. Outside of corporate law, plaintiffs’ attorneys frequently
negotiated coupon-only settlements in consumer class action. 139
In these settlements, the class members received coupons (i.e.,
five dollars off the purchase of a product made or sold by the
defendants), while class counsel received multimillion-dollar
fees. 140 Consumers often had to follow burdensome procedures
to redeem these coupons, and class members who chose not to
do so received no benefit from the settlement. 141
136. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation:
Dispute-Settlement and Rule-Making, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 652 (1976)
(“Furthermore, when the purpose of negotiation is dispute-settlement, the
process tends to be a zero-sum game (that is, a contest in which the winner’s
gains are exactly balanced by the loser’s losses).”).
137. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 244 (“[In nonmonetary settlements,]
the defendants will probably still have to pay some money to the plaintiffs’
attorney in fees, but the overall cost to the defendants will be much less than
if they had to pay both the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ attorney.”).
138. See Sale, supra note 34, at 414 (arguing that judges are not
“functioning as the fiduciaries the law requires them to be”).
139. See S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 15–20 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 30 (providing myriad examples of coupon class actions).
140. See id. (listing the fees awarded in these cases).
141. See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon
Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 991, 995 (2002) (“In many cases, the coupons are laden with restrictions
intended to make redemption difficult.”).
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Congress set its sights on these settlements in the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA). 142 The legislative history stated
that the provisions related to coupon settlements were “aimed
at situations in which plaintiffs’ lawyers negotiate settlements
under which class members receive nothing but essentially
valueless coupons, while the class counsel receive substantial
attorneys’ fees.” 143 CAFA required attorneys’ fees to be based on
the value of the coupons that are actually redeemed, rather than
the purely hypothetical value of coupons that sit unused in class
members’ drawers. 144 They also required courts reviewing such
settlements to make written findings that the settlement terms
will benefit class members. 145
The point of this discussion is not that nonmonetary
settlements are always bad. There have been some valuable
disclosures in merger lawsuits, some valuable corporate
governance reforms in derivative suits, and some valuable
coupons in consumer class actions. 146 Nonmonetary settlements
cannot be reduced to a simple black or white/good or bad
analysis. Yet these settlements do provide a unique opportunity
for plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants to exploit the agency
costs in shareholder litigation. 147 By viewing the disclosure-only
settlements in merger litigation in isolation, divorced from the
broader history and context of shareholder litigation, courts
have overlooked their risks. As a result, when these settlements
started to become common in merger cases, courts in Delaware
142. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
143. S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 30 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
29–30.
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2018)
If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of
coupons to a class member, the portion of any attorney’s fee award
to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons
shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that
are redeemed.
145. See id. (“[T]he court may approve the proposed settlement only after
a hearing to determine whether, and making a written finding that, the
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members.”).
146. See Fisch et al., supra note 33, at 559 (stating that there is at least a
slight benefit to the plaintiffs).
147. See supra notes 135–141 and accompanying text.
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were fairly sanguine, approving these settlements with little
scrutiny. 148 Had courts recognized these settlements as a new
iteration of a broader problem, they might have stepped in
earlier and used greater scrutiny to prevent the problems in
merger litigation from getting as bad as they did.
B.

A Race from Delaware’s Courts
1.

Merger Litigation

Delaware has never had a monopoly on merger litigation.
Instead, these cases have long been spread among various state
courts. 149 Nonetheless, Delaware has presided over a
substantial percentage of these cases in recent years. 150 In 2004
and 2005, for example, companies facing a merger class action
were sued in Delaware courts approximately 40 percent of the
time. 151 This percentage dipped between 2006 and 2009, but
then rebounded between 2011 and 2015. 152 During this latter
period, which is the same period in which merger litigation was
at its peak, more than half of all companies sued in connection
with a merger or acquisition faced at least one lawsuit in
Delaware. 153 Even if these companies faced parallel litigation in
other courts, Delaware had some oversight over most of these
disputes. 154
At various times during this period, these cases dominated
the docket of the Delaware Court of Chancery, outnumbering all
other types of shareholder lawsuits. 155 In their landmark study
of corporate litigation, Professors Thomas and Thompson found
that merger class actions comprised approximately 80 percent
148. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 225 (“For several years, judges in
Delaware decried the developments in merger litigation.”).
149. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621 tbl.1 (detailing the percentage of
merger filings in various state courts).
150. See id. (demonstrating that 60 percent of mergers were filed in
Delaware in 2015).
151. See id. (illustrating the percentage of mergers filed in Delaware).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See Thompson & Thomas I, supra note 31, at 137 (stating that these
actions made up “the vast bulk” of Delaware court representative litigation).
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of the breach of fiduciary duty claims filed in the Delaware
Court of Chancery in 1999 and 2000. 156 They concluded that, at
least for Delaware, merger class actions “have become the most
visible form of shareholder litigation.” 157 The concentration of
these lawsuits in Delaware made it easier for Delaware judges
to oversee the changes in this area and create a cohesive body of
law to respond to these changes.
Federal courts traditionally played a much smaller role in
merger litigation. Studies show that, between 2003 and 2007,
less than 50 percent of merger cases were filed in federal
court. 158 Federal courts oversaw securities class actions alleging
other forms of corporate malfeasance, but shareholders rarely
asked them to intervene in corporate mergers. 159 Federal and
state courts thus abided by a rough division of the corporate and
securities landscape—federal courts focused on disclosure
claims outside of the merger context, while state courts,
especially Delaware, handled merger cases as well as other
cases alleging that corporate directors breached their fiduciary
duty.
In 2015, however, the Delaware Court of Chancery handed
down its decision in Trulia, cracking down on the
disclosure-only settlements in merger litigation. 160 The fallout
from this case was swift and dramatic, with plaintiffs in merger
class actions immediately leaving Delaware for other
jurisdictions. In 2015, 60 percent of companies sued in
connection with a merger or acquisition faced at least one
lawsuit in Delaware. 161 By 2017, that percentage had fallen to 9
percent. 162 These cases primarily ended up in federal court. 163
156. Id. at 137.
157. Id. at 207.
158. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621 tbl.1 (finding that 7 percent of
merger cases were filed in federal court in 2003, 0 percent in 2004, 7 percent
in 2005, 12 percent in 2006, and 13 percent in 2007).
159. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 272 (stating that securities class
actions are filed in federal court).
160. See generally In re Trulia S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
161. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621 tbl.1.
162. See id.
163. See id. (reporting that the number of class actions filed in federal
court increased from 20 percent in 2015 to 87 percent in 2017).
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Recent data from Cornerstone Research found that, in 2018, 91
percent of deals were challenged in federal court. 164
Shareholders did not just leave state courts. They have also
left state law. Traditionally, Delaware law followed these cases
regardless of where they were filed. Under choice of law rules, a
corporation’s internal affairs are governed by the law of the
state where the corporation is incorporated. 165 As a result,
Delaware fiduciary duty law governs a merger case filed against
a Delaware corporation, even if that case was filed in federal
court or in another state court. 166 As shareholders fled to federal
court, however, they also repackaged their claims as federal
securities claims rather than breach of fiduciary duty claims,
skirting traditional choice of law rules. 167 By rejecting both
Delaware’s courts and its law, shareholders were able to avoid
Delaware’s scrutiny altogether.
Today, merger cases comprise a significant percentage of
overall securities class actions. In 2009, for example, only 4
percent of securities class actions related to a merger or
acquisition; by 2019, nearly 40 percent did. 168 These figures
illustrate how plaintiffs’ firms have searched for a new way to
challenge corporate deals in the wake of Delaware’s crackdown
on the cases filed in their courts.
This shift into federal court may not be permanent. The
federal securities laws provide for increased scrutiny of
164. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING
ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2018 M&A LITIGATION 4 (2019)
[hereinafter REVIEW OF 2018 M&A LITIGATION] (reporting findings).
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 302 cmt. e (AM.
LAW INST. 1977)
Application of the local law of the state of incorporation will usually
be supported by those choice-of-law factors favoring the needs of the
interstate and international systems, certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, protection of justified expectations of the
parties and ease in the application of the law to be applied.
166. See Jan Ting, Why Do So Many Corporations Choose to Incorporate in
Delaware?, WHYY (Apr. 27, 2011), https://perma.cc/ZCE8-252W (describing
how and why Delaware became the powerhouse of corporate legal authority in
the United States and mechanics of the Court of Chancery).
167. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 246 (explaining that the PSLRA
overhauled the rules governing securities class actions).
168. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2019
YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2020).
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securities claims, including heightened pleading standards,
stays on discovery, and mandatory Rule 11 inquiries, and it is
too early to tell how this scrutiny will impact merger cases. 169
Additionally, it is unclear whether federal courts will follow
Delaware’s lead in rejecting many disclosure-only settlements.
The primary reason that shareholders started filing their claims
in federal court was to avoid Trulia’s scrutiny of disclosure-only
settlements, as well as other Delaware cases that made it more
difficult for shareholders to pursue their state law claims. 170 Yet
at least a few federal courts have adopted Trulia. 171 Most federal
courts have not ruled on this issue, leaving open the possibility
that they will review disclosure-only settlement under more
traditionally deferential standards. Until more courts weigh in,
shareholders still have an incentive to file their suit in a federal
forum that may be more hospitable to their claims. 172
At the end of the day, however, the move of merger cases to
the federal courts means that it is harder for any one court to
exercise oversight over these cases. If these cases were all
concentrated in Delaware, the Delaware Court of Chancery
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2018) (listing the requirements for securities
fraud actions).
170. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621–22 (discussing the immediate
effects of Trulia).
171. See, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725–26
(7th Cir. 2016) (adopting Trulia because courts have “a continuing duty in a
class action case to scrutinize the class attorney to see that he or she is
adequately protecting the interests of the class”); Malone v. CST Brands, Inc.,
No. SA-16-CA-0955-FB, 2016 WL 8258791, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2016)
(citing Trulia favorably for the proposition that “the public interest is not
served by a strike suit designed to obtain a disclosure only settlement”).
172. It is also unclear how the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) applies to merger class actions. Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.). The PSLRA includes several provisions designed to
crack down on frivolous litigation, including heightened pleading standards
for certain elements of securities fraud claims, mandatory Rule 11 inquiries at
the end of the litigation, and (perhaps most importantly) a requirement that
attorneys’ fees “not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any
damages . . . actually paid to the class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. These restrictions
mean that the federal courts have their own set of tools to curtail frivolous
merger cases, at least if these suits are filed under the federal securities laws.
It remains to be seen, however, whether they will actually use these tools to
stem the rising tide of merger cases in federal court.
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could monitor them and shape the law in ways that account for
broader trends and issues. 173 As we will explore, however, if an
individual court or judge only has one merger case, it becomes
harder for them to see the case as part of this broader picture
and to do much to influence this picture. 174
2.

Derivative Suits

When merger cases first moved into federal courts,
commentators analyzed this shift as a new phenomenon in
corporate litigation. Yet derivative suits moved into federal
courts years ago, and today most derivative suits are filed in
federal court. 175 The earlier move of derivative suits into federal
court foreshadowed the later trends in merger litigation,
highlighting Delaware’s difficulty in holding onto its cases.
The historical trajectory of derivative suits is more
complicated than the more recent story of merger litigation.
Shareholders started filing derivative suits in the United States
in the 1800s. 176 The earliest cases in the United States were
filed in state court and involved minority shareholders
challenging malfeasance by the corporation’s directors and
officers. 177
Before long, however, corporations started to embrace
derivative suits, recognizing that they made it easier for
corporations to secure a federal forum. For example, the first
derivative suit filed in federal court challenged the legality of an

173. See Ting, supra note 166 (explaining why the concentration of
business law cases in Delaware is beneficial to business).
174. See infra Part III.
175. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1754 (stating that “most” shareholder
derivative suits are filed in federal court).
176. See Scarlett, supra note 72, at 871 (tracing the history of shareholder
derivative suits in the United States).
177. See, e.g., Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 231 (N.Y. Ch. 1832)
(alleging that the corporation’s managers had mismanaged the corporation’s
assets); Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162, 164–65 (1831) (alleging
that the corporation’s directors had engaged in fraudulent practices that
depreciated the value of the corporation’s stock); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart.
(n.s.) 68, 68 (La. 1829) (alleging that the corporation’s directors engaged in
“fraudulent and unfaithful conduct”).
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Ohio state tax levied on an Ohio bank. 178 The bank did not want
to contest the tax in Ohio state court for obvious reasons, so an
out-of-state shareholder brought the suit instead. 179 The suit
was styled as a derivative suit against the bank’s directors and
the Ohio tax collector for failing to challenge the tax in court. 180
The directors did not contest the allegations. 181 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that there was diversity jurisdiction over
the suit, 182 paving the way for corporations to use derivative
suits to create a federal forum for their state law challenges. 183
Within a few decades, however, corporations became more
skeptical of derivative suits as more shareholders started to use
them to challenge management’s decisions. 184 At the same time,
federal courts started to cut back on forum shopping in
derivative suits. 185 In a series of decisions, the U.S. Supreme
Court criticized corporations for manufacturing federal
jurisdiction. 186 It also created new procedural hurdles for these
178. See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 336 (1856) (articulating
the nature of the case before the court).
179. See id. (stating that the plaintiff was a citizen of Connecticut).
180. See id. at 339 (“[The plaintiff stockholder] had requested the directors
of the bank to take measures, by suit or otherwise, to assert the franchises of
the bank against the collection of what he believes to be an unconstitutional
tax, and that they had refused to do so.”).
181. See id. (“To this bill the defendant, George C. Dodge, filed an answer.
The other defendants did not answer.”).
182. See id. at 356 (“We do not know a case more appropriate to show the
necessity for such a jurisdiction than that before us.”).
183. See City of Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 626, 627–28 (1873)
(using a derivative suit to contest the legality of an Iowa state tax); City of
Memphis v. Dean, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 64, 74 (1869) (using a derivative suit to
litigate the legality of a contract between the corporation and the City of
Memphis); see also Dennis, supra note 52, at 1486 (“[Dodge] implicitly
condoned the calculated resort of corporate counsel to federal stockholder
actions to gain more favorable outcomes than they anticipated obtaining in a
direct suit by their clients in state court.”).
184. See Dennis, supra note 52, at 1517 (explaining that corporate leaders
began to view derivative suits “less as a useful tool”).
185. See id. at 1500–01 (noting that corporations used improper practices
to achieve jurisdiction in federal courts).
186. See, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 453 (1881) (lamenting the
fact that “the overburdened courts of the United States have this additional
important litigation imposed upon them by a simulated and conventional
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suits, including the demand requirement and the
contemporaneous ownership requirement. 187
In response to these developments, shareholders slowly
returned to state court to file their derivative suits. Empirical
data is not available regarding the precise percentage of
derivative suits filed in federal versus state court during the
twentieth century. Nonetheless, the literature suggests that
these suits were primarily in state court. 188 For example, the
first significant study of derivative suits examined those filed in
certain New York state and federal courts. 189 The study found
that, between 1932 and 1942, a total of 1,400 derivative suits
were filed in the two New York state courts (New York County
and King County) as well as one New York federal court (the
Southern District of New York). 190 Of these 1,400 suits, only
130—or 9.3 percent—were filed in federal court. 191
At some point over the next several decades, however, these
cases slowly shifted to federal court. Again, the empirical record
is incomplete, so it is difficult to tell exactly when this shift
occurred. Nonetheless, by the late 1990s, the data suggests that
most derivative suits were filed in federal court. 192 For example,
a study of derivative suits in federal court found that
shareholders filed four times as many derivative suits in federal
court than they did in Delaware. 193 This study concluded that
“[t]he federal courts are now the center of a significant
arrangement, unauthorized by the facts of the case or by the sound principles
of equity jurisdiction”).
187. See Dennis, supra note 52, at 1496 (“The Court . . . require[d]
that stockholders make a sincere demand on a board of directors and receive
a clear refusal of that demand prior to bringing a federal derivative action.”).
188. See Scarlett, supra note 72, at 905 (discussing the findings of a 1944
study of shareholder derivative litigation).
189. See FRANKLIN S. WOOD, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF NEW YORK,
SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS 6 (1944)
(reporting the results of the study).
190. Id. at 3–4.
191. Id. at 4.
192. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1788 (postulating that
plaintiffs filed more suits in federal courts for the purpose of avoiding 102(b)(7)
in Delaware courts).
193. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1762 (reporting the results of the
study).
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percentage of corporate litigation.” 194 A related study of reported
decisions concerning derivative suits found that the majority of
these decisions were from federal court. 195 Finally, a study of
stock option backdating cases filed in 2006 and 2007 found that
most of the derivative suits were filed in federal court,
regardless of whether the plaintiff corporation was incorporated
in Delaware or another state. 196
There are likely two reasons for the shift of these cases into
federal court. First, derivative suits are often filed in the same
court as parallel securities class actions. 197 Studies have shown
that shareholder derivative suits often arise out of the same
underlying allegations as securities class actions. 198 A
corporation that misstates its financial results, for example, will
likely face a multitude of lawsuits. 199 It will face one or more
securities class actions alleging that the corporation’s public
filings were false and misleading. 200 It may also face a
shareholder derivative suit alleging that the corporation’s board
of directors violated its fiduciary duty of oversight by failing to
194. Id.
195. See Davis, supra note 62, at 419 tbl.1 (noting that, of these cases,
those involving allegations of corporate impropriety are more likely to be filed
in federal court than cases involving allegations that a controlling shareholder
exploited its control over the corporation).
196. See Quinn Curtis & Minor Myers, Do the Merits Matter? Empirical
Evidence on Shareholder Suits from Options Backdating Litigation, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 291, 319 tbl.1 (2016) (finding that 56 percent of the cases brought on
behalf of Delaware corporations were filed in federal court, as were 63 percent
of cases brought on behalf of non-Delaware corporations).
197. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1827 (“The vast majority of the
derivative suits in my study filed on behalf of public companies were
accompanied by a parallel securities class action.”).
198. See Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An
Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 68 (2011) [hereinafter Erickson
V] (“As the data above indicate, a significant percentage of shareholder
derivative suits are accompanied by at least one parallel lawsuit, most
commonly a securities class action filed in federal court.”).
199. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 53, at 1763 (“Many corporate
complaints have elements of both breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, so
substitution of one kind of litigation for another is a recurring possibility, even
as the reach of each law and its perceived utility changes over time.”).
200. See id. at 1775 (providing an example of a securities class action
alleging that a company produced misleading disclosures).
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prevent the misstatements. 201 The settlements in securities
class actions are typically much larger than the settlements
derivative suits, so the securities class actions tend to
dominate. 202 As a result, it is not uncommon for shareholders
who file derivative suits to file in the same court as a related
securities class action and then litigate their claims on a parallel
schedule. 203
Second, as we have seen in merger class actions,
shareholders may have started filing derivative suits in federal
court to avoid the scrutiny of Delaware courts. In the merger
context, shareholders file their cases in Delaware to avoid
Trulia’s close review of disclosure-only settlements because
federal courts use their own procedural standards to review
settlements. 204 Similarly, by filing their claims under the
federal securities laws, shareholders can avoid Delaware
substantive law that makes it difficult for them to prevail on
their claims. 205 In derivative suits, however, the law is largely
the same whether shareholders file in state or federal court. 206
The internal affairs doctrine provides that the law of the state
of incorporation applies to any fiduciary duty claim, regardless
201. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1819 (“Many derivative suits are
premised on a board’s failure to prevent or remedy misconduct.”).
202. Compare Thomas & Thompson, supra note 53, at 1777–78 (finding
that few derivative suits end with a cash payment to the plaintiff corporation),
with CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2019
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2020) (reporting a median settlement in securities
class actions of $11.5 million).
203. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1776 (“These parallels between
securities class actions and derivative suits reflect a larger trend of
shareholders filing derivative suits on the heels of filing a securities class
action.”).
204. See supra notes 158–164 and accompanying text.
205. See Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay
Provisions Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE
CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES 2 (Steven Davidoff Solomon &
Randall S. Thomas, eds., 2017) (“Once it became clear that Delaware would
act to curtail merger-related nuisance claims, these lawyers began to take
their claims elsewhere.”).
206. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 53, at 1763–64 (“Within this
dual federal-state system, and a state system with more than fifty
jurisdictions, procedural and jurisdictional rules make it possible to file suits
in multiple jurisdictions arising from the same act, even if each jurisdiction
applies the same substantive law.”).
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of where it is filed. 207 Moreover, state and federal courts tend to
have similar procedural rules for derivative suits, such as the
demand requirement. 208 As a result, forum shopping in a
derivative suit does not afford the plaintiff a different set of
applicable laws.
Yet Delaware courts may differ from federal courts in how
they apply the law, even if the law itself is the same in either
forum. As the courts charged to oversee Delaware law, they have
more flexibility to change course and start cracking down on
certain types of cases than federal courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction. 209 Delaware courts also see themselves as the
guardian of Delaware corporate law, and therefore they may feel
more responsibility to police frivolous claims. 210 Moreover, if a
significant number of fiduciary duty cases are filed in Delaware,
they can respond to broader trends in a way that is difficult for
a federal court that may only see one or two corporate cases a
year. 211 As a result, Delaware courts may often have a more
skeptical eye than their federal counterparts, causing plaintiffs
with weaker claims to adopt an “anywhere but Chancery”

207. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“No
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a
State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations . . . .”).
208. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)(a) (requiring derivative plaintiffs
to state with particularity in their complaint “any effort by the plaintiff to
obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority and, if
necessary, from the shareholders or members”), with DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(b)
(“The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by
the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or
comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort.”).
209. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 268 (explaining, for example, how
the second prong of the business judgement rule “gives judges the flexibility
to override an SLC decision when something feels ‘off’”).
210. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 961 (Del.
Ch. 2010) (“[While] policing frequent filers may cost some members of the bar
financially, in the long run it enhances the legitimacy of our State and its law
not to facilitate a system of transactional insurance through quasi-litigation.”).
211. See Anywhere but Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and
Suggests Some Solutions, 7 M&A J. 17, 17 (2007) (“Someone once commented
on a panel that trying to argue Delaware fiduciary duty cases outside of
Delaware is like taking Galatoire’s secret recipes and giving them to a
Jack-In-The-Box short-order cook.”).

1166

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1131 (2020)

approach. 212 This approach helps explain why many
shareholders may have chosen to file their derivative claims in
federal court. 213
As this history demonstrates, derivative suits moved into
federal court long before merger litigation. This earlier shift
received less attention than the later shift of merger litigation,
but putting the two together reveals a broader development in
corporate litigation. Across the board, shareholder suits have
slowly moved from Delaware and other state courts to federal
court, making it more difficult for Delaware to police these
claims. 214
C.

Board as Litigation Gatekeeper
1.

Merger Litigation

Over the past several years, the board of directors has
emerged as the newest gatekeeper for frivolous merger
claims. 215 As it became clear that Delaware was losing control
over these cases, the state authorized corporate boards to take
new steps to bring these cases back to Delaware and possibly go
even further in restricting these cases. 216 In 2010, the Delaware
Court of Chancery recognized that its efforts to crack down on
frivolous claims may be causing these cases to flee to other
jurisdictions. 217 To curb this trend, it invited corporate boards
to adopt “charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for
212. See id. at 18 (quoting Ted Mirvis of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and
Katz).
213. See id. at 17 (explaining that plaintiffs’ lawyers perceive greater
settlements opportunities and greater vagary in results outside of Delaware).
214. See John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUDS. 605, 607, 629 (2012) (focusing on published decisions in cases
filed against Delaware companies, merger and acquisition cases, and litigation
challenging leveraged buyouts).
215. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 258–59 (discussing the corporation’s
role in addressing frivolous lawsuits).
216. See id. (explaining that corporations began to “experiment by putting
other heightened procedures” into their bylaws and charters after the courts
authorized fee-shifting provisions).
217. See In re Revlon, 990 A.2d at 960 (“Perhaps greater judicial oversight
of frequent filers will accelerate their efforts to populate their portfolios by
filing in other jurisdiction.”).
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intra-entity disputes” if “boards of directors and stockholders
believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and
value-promoting locus for dispute resolution.” 218 Although this
invitation was focused on forum selection clauses in corporate
charters, many companies quickly included these provisions in
their bylaws, 219 which corporate boards can typically amend on
their own. 220 Within four years of Delaware’s invitation, more
than seven hundred public companies had adopted forum
selection clauses. 221
This development opened the door for boards to include
other procedural mechanisms in corporations’ governing
document that make it more difficult for shareholders to file
certain types of fiduciary duty claims. After considerable debate,
the Delaware General Assembly banned corporations from
adopting fee-shifting provisions. 222 The Delaware Court of
Chancery, however, has suggested that other forms of private
ordering would likely pass muster, at least absent evidence that
the board had an improper motive in adopting them. 223
218. Id.
219. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 53, at 1812 (“Some companies
have put forum selection provisions in their charters prior to an initial public
offering (IPO), a few have submitted charter amendments to a shareholder
vote, but most of the adoptions by established public companies (still a small
percentage of public companies) have been via director-passed bylaws . . . .”).
220. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (“The bylaws may contain
any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of
incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its
affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders,
directors, officers or employees.”).
221. See Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution
to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 31, 33
(2017) (finding that, as of August 2014, 746 public companies had adopted
these provisions).
222. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (“The bylaws may not contain
any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’
fees or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an
internal corporate claim, as defined in § 115 of this title.”), with OKLA. STAT.
tit. 18, § 1126 (2020) (mandating fee-shifting in all shareholder derivative
suits).
223. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 560 (Del.
2014) (“Legally permissible bylaws adopted for an improper purpose are
unenforceable in equity. The intent to deter litigation, however, is not
invariably an improper purpose.”).
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Corporate boards have responded to this invitation by adopting
other types of provisions including minimum ownership
requirements, 224 arbitration requirements, 225 and bond
requirements. 226 So far, these provisions are still relatively rare,
but they show the potential for private ordering to curb the
problems in merger litigation.
This new role for corporate boards reflects a broader
acknowledgment that other gatekeepers involved in these cases
may not be able to prevent these problems. 227 Most shareholder
plaintiffs often lack sufficient incentives to closely monitor these
lawsuits. 228 As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys can make litigation
decisions that benefit themselves at the expense of the real
parties in interest. 229 Judges are supposed to keep a watchful
eye on the litigation to curb these problems, but this monitoring
224. See, e.g., Imperial Holdings, Inc., Amended and Restated Bylaws,
Current Report (Form 8–K) (Nov. 3, 2014) (stating that directors “need not
be . . . shareholders of the corporation”).
225. See Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Portnoy, No. 13-10405-DJC, 2014
WL 1271528, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (concluding that the court was
precluded from deciding whether the arbitration provision was valid and
enforceable); Katz v. Commonwealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001299, 2014 WL
9913855, at *2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 19, 2014) (granting defendants’ Petition for
an Order to Arbitrate); see also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate
Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder
Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 33 (2016) (“The 800-pound gorilla in the room
that has yet to be addressed is whether any states will permit corporate bylaws
that mandate sending shareholder-manager disputes to arbitration.”).
226. See Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 3,
2014) (amending bylaws to create surety requirements for security holder
claimants).
227. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 239 (“None of the gatekeepers in
these areas, however, have solved all of the problems in shareholder
litigation.”).
228. See Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New
Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 45 (2002)
(“Common to all agency problems is their correlation with the asymmetry of
information between the principal and the agent. The less the principal is
informed, the higher the agency costs will be.”); Macey & Miller, supra note
13, at 19–20 (attributing high agency costs in class action and derivative
litigation primarily to the inability of the class to effectively monitor the
attorneys).
229. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 714 (“Often, the plaintiff’s attorneys and
the defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests of the
plaintiffs.”).
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role is difficult in merger litigation, which presents unusual
problems not found in other types of litigation. 230 Delaware
judges have an advantage over other state and federal judges
because they are well aware of the rising problems in merger
litigation and have a vested interest in protecting the
shareholder litigation franchise. 231 Yet, as we have seen,
Delaware judges started losing their cases once they cracked
down, with plaintiffs simply filing their claims elsewhere to
avoid this scrutiny. 232
Given the limitations of these other gatekeepers, it is not
surprising that the legal system looked for another group to help
address the problems with these suits. In theory, corporate
boards are an obvious choice. They oversee the corporation’s
business and affairs more generally, 233 and they have an
interest in protecting the corporation from frivolous
litigation. 234 That said, corporate boards have an inherent
conflict of interest when it comes to merger litigation, as they
are typically among the defendants in these suits. 235 These suits
230. See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del.
Ch. 2016) (“The lack of an adversarial process often requires that the Court
become essentially a forensic examiner of proxy materials so that it can play
devil’s advocate in probing the value of the ‘get’ for stockholders in a proposed
disclosure settlement.”); see also Griffith, supra note 14, at 20 (“Judges
tempted to launch a thorough inquiry into the merits of a claim at the time of
settlement face significant information asymmetries exacerbated by a
non-adversarial process and an undeveloped factual record.”).
231. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 257 (noting the Delaware Court of
Chancery judges’ expertise).
232. See infra Part III.B.1; see also In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 899
(recognizing that enhanced judicial scrutiny of disclosure settlements could
lead plaintiffs to sue fiduciaries of Delaware corporations in other jurisdictions
in the hope of finding a forum more hospitable to signing off on settlements of
“no genuine value”). The court in Trulia expressed hope that their “sister
courts will reach the same conclusion if confronted with the issue.” Id.
233. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019) (“The business and affairs
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”).
234. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 273 (suggesting bylaw and charter
amendments as two mechanisms to shield off frivolous lawsuits).
235. See id. at 276 (“Directors know that they are the likely defendants in
any future shareholder lawsuit. It is inevitable, therefore, that their own
self-interest will influence their decision making, especially as they consider
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typically allege that the board members breached their fiduciary
duty to the corporation by failing to cause the corporation to
disclose all material information about the merger to the
shareholders or by approving an inadequate merger price. 236 As
a result, they face their own personal incentives to make it
harder for shareholders to file these claims, even if these suits
are in the best interests of shareholders. 237 As we will see in the
next section, however, this is not the first time that corporate
law has given potentially conflicted directors an outsized role in
overseeing shareholder litigation. 238
2.

Derivative Suits

Corporate boards have long played a pivotal role in
shareholder derivative suits. 239 Although shareholders file these
suits on behalf of the plaintiff corporation, corporate law gives
the board multiple opportunities to gain control over the
litigation. 240 First, before a shareholder can file a derivative
suit, it must make a demand on the corporation’s board, asking
the board to file the suit itself. 241 The demand requirement gives
corporate boards the opportunity to take control of the lawsuit
proposed amendments that will make it more difficult for them to be sued.”);
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Paving the Delaware Way:
Legislative and Equitable Limits on Bylaws After ATP, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
335, 377 (2015) (“In particular, the board’s decision to adopt or to invoke a
fee-shifting bylaw—or any bylaw that raises the similar specter of
self-interest— must be enjoined where that decision constitutes an improper
purpose or is otherwise inequitable under the circumstances.”).
236. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 253 (“Traditionally, a shareholder
challenging a merger or acquisition would allege that the price was too low or
the terms too onerous.”).
237. See id. at 260–61 (explaining corporations’ interest in obtaining quick
resolutions and cheap settlements).
238. See supra Part III.2.
239. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 263 (noting corporate boards’
historic role as the “primary gatekeepers”).
240. See id. at 264 (identifying two procedural mechanisms which return
power to the board).
241. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(b) (“The complaint shall also allege with
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the
plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons
for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”).
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if they wish. 242 Delaware courts have held that this requirement
is excused if demand would be futile, typically because the board
faces a conflict of interest in reviewing it. 243 Second, if the case
makes it past the demand requirement, the corporation can
form a SLC that will investigate the allegations in the complaint
and determine whether the suit is in the corporation’s best
interest. 244 If they decide that the suit is not in the corporation’s
best interest, they can ask the court to dismiss the suit. 245
The demand requirement and SLC committees give
corporate boards an opportunity to take control over derivative
suits. 246 The rationale behind these procedures is that the
plaintiff corporation is the real party in interest in these suits,
and the board is normally entrusted to make decisions on behalf
of the corporation. 247 Where directors face a significant risk of
personal liability or another conflict of interest, it makes sense
to place shareholders in charge of these suits instead. 248 If,
242. See Am. Int’l Grp. v. Greenburg, 965 A.2d 763, 808 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(“[The demand requirement] exists to preserve the primacy of board
decisionmaking [sic] regarding legal claims belonging to the corporation.”).
243. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984), overruled in part
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (“In our view demand can only
be excused where facts are alleged with particularity which create a
reasonable doubt that the directors’ action was entitled to the protections of
the business judgment rule.”).
244. See In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 986 (Del. Ch.
2007) (explaining that the SLC must determine whether pursuing litigation
“would be excessively costly to the corporation or harm its long-term strategic
interests”).
245. See Minor Myers, The Decisions of Corporate Special Litigation
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1313 (2009) (“If the
SLC concludes that pressing the claims is not in the best interests of the
corporation, it will generally produce a written report supporting its
conclusion and will move on behalf of the corporation to dismiss the claims.”).
246. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 264 (“Where possible, however, the
law tries to return power to the board. This effort is reflected in two procedural
mechanism—the demand requirement and special litigation committees.”).
247. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120
(Del. Ch. 2009) (“The decision whether to initiate or pursue a lawsuit on behalf
of the corporation is generally within the power and responsibility of the board
of directors.”).
248. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 264–65 (stating that directors are
unlikely to initiate litigation where the risk of personal liability is
“meaningful”).
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however, directors (or a committee of directors) can review the
allegations in an unbiased way, there is no reason to usurp their
authority. 249
These procedures reflect traditional corporate law
principles of board primacy, but they also raise questions about
whether board members can objectively review derivative
claims. 250 The demand requirement and SLC review are
premised on the idea that directors are either biased or
unbiased. 251 If they themselves face a significant risk of liability
or are beholden to the corporation or another defendant, then
they are biased and cannot objectively review a shareholder
demand or serve on an SLC. 252 Otherwise, however, they are
deemed independent and can use the available means to regain
control over the suit. 253
Yet independence is not an on/off switch. As many scholars
and even courts have noted, directors can face more subtle
pressure to reject derivative claims, even if they are technically
independent. 254 In controlling shareholder contexts, for
example, directors may worry that, if they approve claims
against the controller, the controller may retaliate in ways that

249. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996), overruled in
part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (stating that “[t]he demand
requirement serves a salutary purpose,” including that “if litigation is
beneficial, the corporation can control the proceedings”).
250. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 266 (questioning whether directors
“can ever act truly independently when it comes to evaluating claims against
fellow directors”).
251. See Davis II, supra note 69, at 1308 (listing the various factors that
are used to determine whether a director is biased).
252. See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216
The basis for claiming excusal would normally be that: (1) a
majority of the board has a material financial or familial interest;
(2) a majority of the board is incapable of acting independently for
some other reason such as domination or control; or (3) the
underlying transaction is not the product of a valid exercise of
business judgment.
253. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 266 (noting that Delaware law
defers to directors free of conflict).
254. See Davis II, supra note 69, at 1317 (“[T]here are subtle, perhaps
unconscious, influences that may cloud an outside director’s objectivity.”).
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hurt the business. 255 More generally, directors may hesitate to
support claims against their fellow directors, even if they are
not technically beholden to them. 256 As the Supreme Court of
Delaware stated, “notwithstanding our conviction that
Delaware law entrusts the corporate power to a properly
authorized committee, we must be mindful that directors are
passing judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation
and fellow directors, in this instance, who designated them to
serve both as directors and committee members.” 257 Under these
circumstances, the court noted: “[t]he question naturally arises
whether a ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ empathy might
not play a role.” 258
Indeed, the procedural record suggests that corporate
directors rarely support bringing claims against their fellow
corporate managers. For example, a recent study of 384 SLC
decisions between 1990 and 2015 found that SLC committees
recommend dismissal of the derivative claims in nearly
three-quarters of the cases in which an SLC filed a report. 259
The SLC only recommends that the company pursue or settle
the litigation in 12 percent of cases, and this percentage has
decreased over time. 260 The SLC process can also consume
255. See Ann M. Lipton, After Corwin: Down the Controlling Shareholder
Rabbit Hole, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1977, 1984 (2019)
Delaware courts continued to remain rock solid in their confidence
that independent directors could faithfully consider a shareholder’s
demand that the corporation pursue litigation against a controlling
shareholder alleged to have breached its duties to the corporation,
despite their refusal to trust independent directors to stand against
controllers in any other context.
See also Da Lin, Beyond Beholden, 44 J. CORP. L. 515, 557 (2019)
(demonstrating the limitations of a legal framework for controlling
shareholder transactions that focuses solely on whether directors are beholden
to the controlling shareholder).
256. See Davis II, supra note 69, at 1307 (“In questioning whether
deference to the SLC’s determination is appropriate, courts and commentators
have often invoked the notion of ‘structural bias.’”).
257. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
258. Id.
259. C.N.V. Krishnan et al., How Do Legal Standards Matter? An
Empirical Study of Special Litigation Committees, 60 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 2 (2020).
260. See id. at 7 (showing a decreasing trend from 22 percent in the period
of 1990–1995 to 8 percent in the period from 2011 to 2015).
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considerable time during the course of the litigation, as the SLC
filed a motion to stay in 38 percent of cases. 261
The demand requirement did not fare much better. One
study of derivative suits in federal court, for example, found that
shareholder plaintiffs only made a demand on the corporation’s
board in 20.3 percent of cases. 262 In other words, despite the fact
that nearly every jurisdiction in the United States requires
shareholders to make a demand prior to filing a lawsuit,
shareholders almost always declined to make a demand and
instead argued that demand would be futile. 263 A study of
derivative litigation in Delaware found a similar result. 264 In
jurisdictions that recognize demand futility as a possible
justification, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on this
ground in nearly 50 percent of the cases. 265 As this data
suggests, even seemingly simple procedural requirements can
force parties to spend considerable time fighting over these
requirements in court. 266
Stepping back, it is possible to draw some comparisons
between the roles of corporate boards in shareholder derivative
suits and merger litigation. In derivative suits, corporate boards
play a larger role because the corporation is the real party in
interest and boards typically have tremendous control over the

261. See id. at 6 (explaining that the motion to stay is “made to permit the
SLC to complete its work without competing activity from the plaintiffs’ law
firms”).
262. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1782 (“[D]espite the demand
requirements adopted in nearly every state, the derivative plaintiff did not
make a presuit demand in nearly 80 percent of the cases.”).
263. See id. at 1782 (explaining that there is a “strong incentive” for
plaintiffs to claim demand futility).
264. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1748–50 (“We did not
find a single example in which the complaint said that a demand had been
made on the directors.”).
265. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1783 (“In the eleven universal demand
cases in which the derivative plaintiff did not make a presuit demand, the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on this basis in five of the cases, or just
under half.”).
266. See id. at 1784 (noting that corporations “spend significant time and
money” fighting over procedural issues).
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corporations. 267 Boards do not have the same power in merger
litigation because corporations are typically the defendants in
these suits and therefore they do not have unilateral power to
block or dismiss the suits. 268 Nonetheless, the board’s
traditionally outsized role in derivative suits can provide insight
into the new powers recently given to boards to include new
procedural rules in corporate charters and bylaws. 269 This
private ordering extends the board’s powers to a broader subset
of shareholder lawsuits, but raises some of the same concerns
that have long been present in derivative suits, as we will see in
the next Part. 270
IV. Uncovering the Lost Lessons of Derivative Suits
Derivative suits have long been in their own analytical
silos.
Commentators
have
recognized
the
common
entrepreneurial roots of most types of shareholder lawsuits,
including derivative suits, but the comparisons have not gone
much further. Yet these suits have much more in common with
other types of shareholder litigation, especially merger
litigation, than has previously been recognized. 271 Indeed, as
Part II demonstrated, many of the problems recently seen in
merger litigation resemble earlier problems seen in derivative
suits. 272 This Part builds on these similarities to develop a set of
broader lessons for shareholder litigation. It first examines the
lessons relating to nonmonetary settlements before developing
lessons for forum selection and the role of corporate boards in
shareholder lawsuits. 273

267. See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025,
1044 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“A corporate claim is an asset of the corporation, so
authority over the claim ordinarily rests with the board of directors.”).
268. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 219–221 and accompanying text.
270. See infra Part IV.
271. See supra Part III.
272. See supra Part II.
273. See infra Part IV.A–B.
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A.

Rethinking Settlements

The problems in merger litigation can be traced in large
part to the prevalence of disclosure-only settlements. These
settlements are relatively cheap, which create incentives for
defendants to settle rather than litigate, even if claims have no
merit. 274 Defendants’ willingness to settle in turn created
incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to file an increasing number
of these cases, leading to the sky-high filing rates of the past
decade. 275 Yet, as Part II.A. explained, these settlements shared
many of the same characteristics as the nonmonetary
settlements that have long been common in derivative suits. 276
The actual consideration varies in the two types of
cases—settlements in merger litigation involve disclosures
about the planned merger, while settlements in derivative suits
include corporate governance reforms. 277 The availability of
nonmonetary relief in both types of suits, however, provided an
incentive for defendants to cheaply settle cases with dubious
merit, fueling the filing of these claims. 278
The shared characteristics of the settlements in these cases
provide two lessons for courts and policymakers. First,
nonmonetary settlements are not a new invention that only
recently appeared in merger litigation. 279 They have been
around for a long time, and they have had a similar impact
across different types of lawsuits. 280 This recognition should
make it easier to identify potential problems if a new brand of
nonmonetary settlements someday appears in shareholder
litigation or in another type of representative litigation.

274. See supra Part II.A.
275. See supra Part II.A.
276. See supra Part II.A.
277. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1754 (“[S]hareholder derivative suits
more commonly end with the parties agreeing to corporate governance
settlements.”).
278. See supra Part II.A.
279. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 716 (“By settling, neither side loses
anything, and both recoup their legal expenses from the corporation (and thus
indirectly from the shareholders).”).
280. See supra Part III.A.
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When disclosure-only settlements started to become more
common in merger litigation, they were viewed as a new
phenomenon. 281 As a result, it took courts in Delaware and
elsewhere several years to recognize and respond to the
problem. Indeed, the prevalence of merger litigation started to
sharply rise in 2009, 282 but the Delaware Court of Chancery did
not adopt a more skeptical standard of review of disclosure-only
settlements until the Trulia decision in 2016. 283 Had the court
recognized disclosure-only settlements as part of the larger
problem of nonmonetary settlements in shareholder litigation,
it might not have taken the court so long to act. 284
Second, the shared characteristics of settlements in both
types of shareholder litigation may suggest a need for a broader
response. Under Delaware law, Trulia governs nonmonetary
settlements in merger litigation, requiring the court to reject a
disclosure-only settlement unless the disclosures are plainly
material. 285 Yet this scrutiny does not extend to nonmonetary
settlements in derivative suits. 286 Instead, Delaware courts
routinely approved derivative settlements that include only
corporate governance reforms. 287 The two types of settlements
exist in wholly separate legal spheres, despite the common
incentives that underlie them. 288
281. See Fisch et al., supra note 33, at 564 (“The Delaware courts
developed the scope of directors’ state law disclosure obligations fairly
recently.”).
282. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 620 (“From 2003 to 2008, litigation
challenges ranged from 33% of completed deals (2004) to 43% of completed
deals (2008). There was a sharp rise in the litigation rate in 2009 to 76% of
completed deals.”).
283. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
286. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (approving nonmonetary settlement while noting that “the changes
in corporate practice that are presented as consideration for the settlement do
not impress one as very significant”).
287. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch.
2016) (discussing the “Court’s willingness in the past” to approve
disclosure-only settlements).
288. See id. at 887 (providing the court’s perspective on only those
disclosure claims “arising in deal litigation”).
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Perhaps the time has come for Delaware to adopt a version
of Trulia for derivative suits. Such a standard would not bar all
nonmonetary settlements in these suits, but it would hold
parties to a higher standard when seeking court approval of
settlements where the primary consideration is corporate
governance reforms. 289 Studies have shown, for example, that
derivative settlements often include reforms that have no
connection whatsoever to the underlying misconduct alleged in
the complaint. 290 These settlements instead often include the
same laundry list of reforms, many of which are empirically
untested or have been shown not to improve firm
performance. 291
Delaware or other jurisdictions could adopt a new standard
of review for nonmonetary settlements in derivative suits that
responds to these specific concerns. As part of this new
standard, courts could require parties to demonstrate that the
reforms included in settlements are specifically tailored to the
types of corporate governance problems identified in the
litigation. If a derivative plaintiff alleges that the corporation’s
board of directors abdicated its oversight responsibilities, the
settlement should include specific reforms that increase the
board’s oversight over the corporation’s business and affairs.
Similarly, any proposed reforms should be supported by specific
studies showing their impact on firm performance or other
relevant metrics or by a detailed explanation of how the reform
will be beneficial to the specific company in question. Courts
may also examine the contractually agreed upon length of the
reforms to make sure that the reforms have a chance to impact
the corporation’s governance practices.

289. See id. (requiring disclosure settlements to be “fair and reasonable”).
290. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1811 (“Many more provisions in the
settlement agreements, however, were not tailored to the specific problems
alleged in the complaint. Indeed, there was often a striking disconnect
between the alleged problems and the reforms in the settlement
agreements.”).
291. See id. at 1755 (“Drawing on business and finance literature, this
Article demonstrates that corporate governance settlements often fail to live
up to their potential because they include reforms that are unlikely to benefit
corporations or their shareholders.”).
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This inquiry would likely be more difficult than the inquiry
under Trulia. Trulia envisions a relatively cabined examination
of the materiality of specific disclosures. 292 The judge must
evaluate the specific disclosures in the context of the merger,
determining whether it significantly adds to the total mix of
information available to shareholders. 293 In conducting this
examination, the judge can build on precedent evaluating
similar disclosures in other merger cases. 294 In derivative suits,
however, the inquiry is not that straightforward. 295 Derivative
suits allege a variety of different types of governance failures,
and it can be difficult to determine whether a specific set of
reforms will have a material impact on the governance of
particular companies. 296 Nonetheless, starting from a more
skeptical vantage point and requiring the parties to identify the
specific benefits of the proposed reforms could help.
Moreover, courts could decide to use a more searching
review whenever they encounter nonmonetary settlements in
representative litigation, even outside of the particular contexts
of merger and derivative litigation. Again, nonmonetary
settlements are not always bad, but they do raise particular
concerns and therefore merit more judicial scrutiny than the
typical settlement. 297 The exact test might vary in different
types of litigation, but if courts heeded the lessons of derivative
suits and merger litigation, they might be better prepared to
292. See In re Trulia, Inc., 129 A.3d at 894 (evaluating the issue of
materiality in the context of supplemental disclosures).
293. See id. at 899 (“[I]nformation is material if, from the perspective of a
reasonable stockholder, there is a substantial likelihood that it ‘significantly
alter[s] the “total mix” of information made available.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994))).
294. See id. at 894 (“In Delaware, the percentage of such cases settled
solely on the basis of supplemental disclosures grew significantly from 45.4%
in 2005 to a high of 76.0% in 2012, and only recently has seen some decline.”).
295. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1815 (explaining that many reforms
in derivative suits are “part of a larger movement” rather than “specific
solutions to specific allegations of misconduct”).
296. See id. at 1822 (finding that many corporate governance settlements
lacked the types of reforms that have proven impactful on corporate
performance).
297. See Fisch et al., supra note 33, at 561 (“[T]he illusory benefit of
supplemental disclosure must be weighed against the clear cost of merger
litigation . . . .”).
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address new types of nonmonetary settlements, regardless of
their precise form.
B.

Rethinking Forum

Scholars and commentators long assumed that corporate
and securities lawsuits each stayed in their own jurisdictional
lane. 298 Corporate lawsuits—i.e., those filed under state
corporate law such as merger litigation and derivative
suits—were filed in state court, with public company suits
primarily in Delaware. 299 In contrast, securities suits—i.e.,
those filed under the federal securities laws—stayed in federal
court. 300 Over time, this dichotomy started to break down. 301
Scholars observed that Delaware was losing its cases, with
shareholders filing an increasing percentage of state corporate
cases in other venues. 302 At the same time, some plaintiffs’
lawyers started to file many securities class actions in state
court, exploiting loopholes in federal legislation providing for
exclusive federal jurisdiction over these cases. 303 These trends
complicated the traditional narrative about forum selection in
corporate and securities litigation.

298. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1760 (“While derivative
suits against public corporations do occur outside the state, the Delaware
courts capture the bulk of derivative litigation against public companies.”).
299. See id. (referring to Delaware as “the country’s most important
corporate law jurisdiction.”).
300. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2018) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to
federal courts over classic securities fraud claims filed under section 10(b) of
the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934); see also Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty.
Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018) (explaining that other types of
securities cases, such as claims brought under Section 11 and 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933, can be brought in either state or federal court).
301. See supra notes 212–213 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 213–214 and accompanying text.
303. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80
U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 350 (2011) (presenting data demonstrating that, after
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, plaintiffs’ attorneys
“increasingly have turned to filing alternative [securities] class actions in state
court”).
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As Part II discussed, however, merger litigation and
derivative suits did not just leave Delaware. 304 Both types of
litigation left Delaware and ended up in federal court. 305
Derivative suits made this shift at least a few decades before
merger litigation, 306 but both types of lawsuits are now filed
primarily in federal court. 307 The scholarly literature has not
previously recognized this point, nor has it fully explored the
consequences of having cases that were traditionally filed in
state court now in federal court.
In unpacking the lessons now, it is important to recognize
that the two types of litigation did not follow identical paths.
With derivative suits, the trend stayed largely under the
radar. 308 No one knows exactly when derivative suits started to
leave Delaware and other state courts, although at least by the
2000s, these suits were firmly in federal court. 309 With merger
litigation, this shift was far more sudden and public. 310 In 2015,
of those mergers challenged in court, 60 percent of mergers were
challenged in Delaware, while only 20 percent were filed in
federal court. 311 Just two years later, in 2017, the numbers
304. See supra Part II.
305. See supra Part III.B.
306. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1754 (finding that, by at least the mid
2000s, most derivative suits were filed in federal court).
307. See supra Part III.B.2.
308. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 41
(1993) (finding that over half of derivative and other corporate lawsuits (71 of
the 139 total suits) were filed in federal courts); Armour et al., supra note 214,
at 610 n.23
In hindsight, Romano’s data suggest that the federal courts have
been a significant venue for corporate lawsuits for some time,
but . . . neither she nor anyone else focused on this. Romano’s
original 1991 study does not discuss where suits were filed; the data
we rely on here are mentioned only in her later book, and only in
passing.
309. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Part III.B.
311. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621 tbl.1 (finding that, between 2003
and 2015, a significant percentage of mergers were challenged in states other
than Delaware). Indeed, many mergers were challenged in multiple courts,
including the Delaware Court of Chancery, the state court in the state where
the corporation was headquartered, and in some instances, federal court. Id.
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looked quite different. Of those mergers challenged in court,
only 9 percent of mergers were challenged in Delaware, while
87 percent were filed in federal court. 312 Merger cases left for
federal court seemingly in the blink of an eye, while the shift for
derivative suits was likely slower. At the end of the day,
however, most derivative suits and merger litigation are now
filed in federal court. 313
Given that derivative suits have been in federal courts for
far longer than merger lawsuits, it is worth asking what lessons
we can draw from this experience. The first lesson is that it is
easy for cases to fall under the radar when they are not
concentrated in a single forum. 314 Once derivative suits moved
into federal court, they became almost invisible. 315 Indeed, a
prominent study of derivative suits assumed that derivative
suits had largely disappeared after looking for these suits in
Delaware and only finding a few of them. 316 After surveying the
Delaware cases, this study concluded that “there are relatively
few derivative suits against public companies” and that they
had receded from the “lofty position” that they had historically
held in corporate law. 317 Other studies referred to these suits as
“dead,” 318 or stated that the evidence suggested that derivative
suits “are not performing a large role in corporate

Yet, throughout this entire period, of those mergers challenged in court, the
percentage of mergers challenged in federal court averaged only 28 percent,
compared to 41 percent challenged in Delaware and 74 percent challenged in
a state court other than Delaware. Id.
312. Id.
313. See supra notes 305–306 and accompanying text.
314. See REVIEW OF 2018 M&A LITIGATION, supra note 164, at 5 (“In 2018,
only 45 percent of challenged M&A deals were litigated in one jurisdiction
only, a five-year low.”).
315. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and
Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1489, 1492 (2006) (“Derivative suits have been eclipsed in recent years
by [other] form[s] of representative litigation . . . .”).
316. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1749 (finding a “small
number of derivative suits”).
317. Id. at 1756, 1773.
318. See Veasey & Dooley, supra note 18, at 142 (discussing how
commentators refer to derivative suits).
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governance.” 319 In short, once these suits left Delaware, people
assumed that these cases had largely disappeared and stopped
paying as much attention to them. 320
It is possible that merger cases will similarly fade from view
once they are no longer concentrated in Delaware. Here, though,
the different trajectories of derivative suits and merger
litigation may play in merger litigation’s favor. Unlike
derivative suits, merger litigation did not go quietly into the
night. 321 The flight of merger litigation into federal court was so
sudden and was such a clear illustration of forum shopping that
it generated significant attention, even prompting judges to
suggest new ways to bring these cases back to Delaware. 322 Yet,
this attention could wane as practitioners grow more
accustomed to these cases being in federal court. And once cases
are scattered across the country, no longer filling up any
particular court’s docket, it will be easier to forget about them.
The point here is not that merger cases definitely will fade from
view, but rather that the legal system should be attentive to the
possibility given the lessons from derivative suits.
Second, even if merger cases stay in the spotlight, it may be
harder to police them now that they have left Delaware. 323 The
Delaware Court of Chancery serves an important monitoring
role when it comes to corporate law. 324 Chancery judges do not
just narrowly handle the cases in front of them; they keep an
eye on broader trends and slowly shape the law to be responsive

319. Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1473 n.164 (2006).
320. See Veasey & Dooley, supra note 18, at 142 (referring to conversations
that pronounced the derivative suit as “already dead and gone and buried”).
321. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 605 (describing Delaware’s response
to excessive merger litigation as forceful).
322. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch.
2010) (suggesting forum selection clauses as a method for bringing cases back
to Delaware).
323. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 257–58 (explaining that few courts
outside of Delaware have the knowledge and incentives to properly police
shareholder litigation).
324. See Sale, supra note 34, at 391 (“Judges have the power and the
responsibility to guard against the agency issues and protect the interests of
the shareholders and class members.”).
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to these trends. 325 This legal evolution then shapes corporate
law throughout the country and even the world. 326 Will fiduciary
duty law related to mergers evolve more slowly now that most
merger cases are filed in federal court?
Again, the lessons of derivative suits are instructive here.
When the majority of derivative suits moved into federal court,
the ones that remained in Delaware looked different than the
federal suits. 327 The derivative suits in federal court tended to
be tagalong suits to securities class actions where derivative
plaintiffs took securities claims and repackaged them as
fiduciary duty claims. 328 These suits often ended with
nonmonetary settlements that offered little benefit to plaintiff
corporations or their shareholders. 329 These suits looked quite
different than the derivative suits that remained in Delaware,
which tended to involve more classic breaches of fiduciary duty,
such as self-dealing or other conflicts of interest. 330 These cases
325. See, e.g., Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & Jason S. Tyler, Docket Dividends:
Growth in Shareholder Litigation Leads to Refinements in Chancery
Procedures, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 473, 524 (2013)
Delaware’s volume of corporate and alternative business entity
cases, the fact that those cases are litigated before the relatively
small, but expert, Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme Court,
and the responsiveness of its courts, its legislature, and the
marketplace generally accelerate the development of refined
doctrine, measured balance, and valuable predictability.
326. See Veasey & Dooley, supra note 18, at 141 (“Delaware has not only
set the standard for the rest of the states in the United States, but increasingly
is exercising influence abroad. For the past 100 years, this state has been the
laboratory where our most fundamental concepts of corporate governance
have been developed and refined.”).
327. See supra Part III.B.2.
328. See Erickson V, supra note 198, at 80. (“Many shareholder derivative
suits may simply serve as tagalong suits to other types of corporate
litigation.”).
329. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1754 (“Remarkably few of the suits in
my study ended with the corporation receiving a meaningful financial benefit.
Instead, shareholder derivative suits more commonly end with the parties
agreeing to corporate governance settlements.”).
330. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1772–73 (reviewing
derivative suits filed in Delaware and finding that “almost 60 percent of the
complaints raise principally a duty of loyalty claim” and that these claims
involved allegations of either self-dealing or mergers involving preferential
treatment for insiders).
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did not raise the same agency costs as the cases filed in federal
court, 331 and as a result Delaware courts may not have been
aware of the problems in these federal cases. It is hard to blame
Delaware courts for failing to fully recognize the problems with
these suits when the cases filed in Delaware courts did not raise
these problems, at least not to the same extent. 332 The end
result, however, was that Delaware has been slower to recognize
the problems in these suits. 333
There is a risk that the same thing could happen in merger
litigation. Even today, merger cases have not fully left
Delaware. 334 In 2018, for example, 13 percent of merger cases
against Delaware corporations were challenged in Delaware,
suggesting that Delaware will still oversee some of these
cases. 335 Yet, if the merger cases that remain in Delaware look
significantly different than cases filed in other jurisdictions,
Delaware judges could miss broader trends. If, for example,
plaintiffs’ attorneys file more meritorious cases in Delaware
with the idea that these cases would survive the scrutiny of
Delaware judges and may benefit from more expert judging,
Delaware judges may not learn about the broader problems
happening with these cases in other jurisdictions. This in turn
could cause Delaware courts to pass up opportunities to shape
the law in ways that could improve the corporate law more

331. See id. at 1750 (“The cases do demonstrate some indicia of litigation
agency costs (for example, suits being filed quickly, multiple suits per
controversy, and repeat plaintiffs’ law firms), but each of these costs is much
less pronounced for derivative suits than for other forms of representative
litigation.”).
332. See id. (“[These cases] raise none of the problems of representative
litigation that can arise in public companies.”).
333. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1094 (1997) (noting that in the
1980s, many management-led buyouts were likely challenged in other states,
but only Delaware developed a robust case law on these types of deals).
“[T]here seems to be a minimum number of cases required to generate a
reasonably well-specified jurisprudence, and only Delaware seems to have
passed this threshold.” Id.
334. See REVIEW OF 2018 M&A LITIGATION, supra note 164, at 5 (surveying
the jurisdictions in which plaintiffs filed merger claims).
335. See id. (reporting results of the review).
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broadly. 336 One corporate lawyer has openly acknowledged this
risk, stating
The success of the Chancery system depends on its exposure
to, and adjudication of, a large and representative docket of
governance and deal cases. A court that handled such cases
only episodically would be more likely to fall victim to the
‘availability heuristic,’ the cognitive bias that causes decision
makers to be overly influenced by proximate examples. 337

The situation in merger litigation is further complicated
because the cases that are leaving Delaware are often also
leaving Delaware law. 338 Any breach of fiduciary duty case filed
against a corporation incorporated in Delaware will still be
governed by Delaware law, regardless of where the cases is
filed. 339 As we have seen, however, not all merger cases today
are breach of fiduciary duty cases. 340 Shareholders can also
challenge mergers under federal law, which eliminates all
oversight by the Delaware judiciary. 341 The restrictions of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act apply to these
claims, 342 but these restrictions are not a perfect fit for the
particular challenges of merger cases. 343 Moreover, these cases
336. See William Savitt, Leave Merger Disclosure Litigation Where It
Belongs, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 173, 182 (2015) (“[A]ssigning disclosure
claims to federal court would . . . interfere with Delaware’s ability to shape its
substantive law . . . .”).
337. Id. at 186.
338. See supra Part III.B.1.
339. See Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns
Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 385 n.37 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that the law of the
state of incorporation governs issues relating to internal affairs).
340. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
341. See supra Part III.B.1.
342. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2018) (“The provisions of this subsection shall
apply in each private action arising under this title [15 U.S.C. § 78a] that is
brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”).
343. For example, the heightened pleading standards in the PSLRA only
come into play if the defendant decides to file a motion to dismiss. Id. The
defendant may agree to pay a mootness fee, rather than challenging the
adequacy of the pleadings, to avoid the expense of a motion to dismiss. Id.
Similarly, the lead plaintiff provisions only help if there are multiple
applicants for the lead plaintiff position, at least some of whom have a
substantial stake in the litigation. Id.
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will be spread across federal courts throughout the country,
making it difficult for particular federal judges to notice broader
trends and respond accordingly.
There is no easy solution to this problem. Derivative suits
are typically filed under state law, so forum selection clauses
included in a corporation’s charter or bylaws can bring these
cases back to Delaware where they will presumably be subject
to more scrutiny. 344 Many federal securities claims, however,
are subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, so corporations
cannot simply decide that all merger cases must be filed in
Delaware. 345 As a result, it will be up to federal law to respond
to the new challenges in these cases, either through greater
judicial oversight or by new federal legislation or rulemaking.
The precise solutions can wait for another day, but the
broader lessons remain. While it is impossible to predict exactly
what will happen in merger litigation, the experience in
derivative suits suggests that merger cases could fade from our
attention now that they have moved into federal court. 346 It
could also be more difficult for courts to police these cases now
that they are more dispersed. In the end, the legal system has
not yet grappled with the costs of forum shopping in merger
litigation, just as it has never grappled with the costs in
derivative suits.
C.

Rethinking Gatekeepers

The final lesson that emerges from the experience in
derivative suits relates to the role of corporate boards. As Part
III.C. explained, in recent years, Delaware opened the door for
boards to include new procedural hurdles in their corporate
charters and bylaws that make it more difficult to file
shareholder lawsuits. 347 As corporate boards start to dabble in
procedural rulemaking, however, courts might heed the lessons
from shareholder derivative suits. In derivative suits, corporate
344. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 n.8 (Del. Ch.
2010) (explaining the value of forum selection clauses while noting companies
may not “wholly exempt themselves from Delaware oversight”).
345. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 315–320 and accompanying text.
347. See supra Part III.C.
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boards have long had the power to take control of litigation
through the demand requirement and the formation of an SLC
committee. 348 This experience provides lessons about the role of
structural bias in board decision making that may be relevant
for courts as they experiment with a new gatekeeping role for
corporate boards in merger litigation. 349
The experience in derivative suits reflects a longstanding
concern over structural bias when it comes to board oversight of
shareholder litigation. 350 In most derivative suits, as in most
merger litigation, directors are among the defendants in the
lawsuit. 351 Even if a derivative complaint does not name the
entire board, the directors who are not named as defendants
may still be predisposed to allow their fellow directors to avoid
liability. 352 Interestingly, the two procedural hurdles in
derivative suits—the demand requirement and SLC
review—handle the risk of structural bias differently, and this
difference provides insights for merger litigation. 353
When it comes to the demand requirement, courts have
adopted a black-or-white view of director independence. 354
Demand is excused only if a majority of the directors cannot
evaluate the demand in an unbiased way. 355 In evaluating
individual directors, the plaintiff must identify specific reasons
why the director cannot evaluate a demand in an independent
348. See supra Part III.C.2.
349. See Davis II, supra note 69, at 1325 (“[E]ven SLC members intent on
doing the right thing face a serious challenge to their objectivity.”).
350. See id. at 1324 n.87 (“Subjects, once induced to espouse a position
they do not believe, will modify their views to conform to their stated position
in order to avoid seeing themselves as dishonest.”).
351. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1772 (“Consistent with the
conventional wisdom, these plaintiffs targeted a significant number of
directors—a median of nine per suit. This number reflects the fact that most
complaints named the entire board of directors.”).
352. See supra notes 256–258 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part III.C.2.
354. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
355. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984), overruled in part
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (“In our view demand can only
be excused where facts are alleged with particularity which create a
reasonable doubt that the directors’ action was entitled to the protections of
the business judgment rule.”).
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way. 356 The risk of structural bias, on its own, is not enough. 357
There are sound reasons for this insistence on particularized
allegations. If derivative plaintiffs could establish that a
director is biased simply by pointing to the omnipresent risk of
structural bias, demand would always be futile. 358
Yet, even if there are pragmatic reasons for conducting a
director-by-director examination, these reasons do not erase the
reality of structural bias. Indeed, conventional wisdom is that,
if a derivative plaintiff makes demand on the board, the board
will almost certainly reject it. 359 Recognizing this fact,
derivative plaintiffs almost never make a demand, instead
arguing that demand is futile. 360 And so the first stage of almost
every derivative suit is a protracted fight over demand
futility. 361 In these fights, courts examine the minute details of
directors’ business and social relationships, while ignoring

356. See id. at 816 (requiring plaintiff only to allege specific facts, not
evidence).
357. See id. at 815 n.8
We recognize that drawing the line at a majority of the board may
be an arguably arbitrary dividing point. Critics will charge that we
are ignoring the structural bias common to corporate boards
throughout America, as well as the other unseen socialization
processes
cutting
against
independent
discussion
and
decisionmaking in the boardroom. The difficulty with structural
bias in a demand futile case is simply one of establishing it in the
complaint for purposes of Rule 23.1.
358. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 276 (“For obvious reasons, directors
are not unbiased decision makers when it comes to deciding if the corporation
should be able to sue them.”).
359. See Matheson, supra note 29, at 359 (stating that if the plaintiff
makes a demand, “the most likely scenario” is that the board will reject it).
Moreover, if the derivative plaintiff makes a demand, courts view the demand
as a tacit admission that the board is competent to review it. Id. In this
scenario, if the board rejects the demand, the plaintiff’s only option is to
challenge the board’s decision as wrongful, which is an uphill battle. Id.
360. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1782 (surveying federal derivative
suits and finding that “despite the demand requirements adopted in nearly
every state, the derivative plaintiff did not make a presuit demand in nearly
80 percent of the cases”).
361. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 267 (“[T]he demand requirement
and the SLC process mean that shareholders must run a gauntlet of
procedural hurdles before they can present the substance of their claims.”).
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broader structural concerns. 362 In short, the review of demand
futility in derivative suits gets bogged down in details of
individual director relationships without ever reckoning with
broader concerns of structural bias. 363
Courts could face similar issues in reviewing new charter
and bylaw amendments that purport to govern merger and
other forms of litigation. The Delaware General Corporate Law
now explicitly authorizes boards to include forum selection
clauses in bylaws and charters, 364 and the Delaware Court of
Chancery has stated that it will permit other rules as long as
they were adopted “for a proper purpose.” 365 On its face, this
standard is quite different than the standard that courts use to
review claims of demand futility, focusing on the subjective
motivations of the adopting board rather than their business or
personal relationships.
Yet, in many ways, its impact may be similar. Both
standards force the court to do an individual assessment focused
on particular directors, whether it be their motivations or
relationships. 366 This assessment will have to be repeated in
every case, as a board’s motivation in one case could differ from
the motivations of another board even if the underlying bylaw
amendments are identical. Yet the time and expense of such a
case-by-case review will still not fully reckon with the risk of

362. See Matheson, supra note 29, at 363 (explaining that courts evaluate
whether a director “will receive a personal financial benefit”).
363. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 817 (“In Delaware mere directorial approval
of a transaction, absent particularized facts supporting a breach of fiduciary
duty claim, or otherwise establishing the lack of independence or
disinterestedness of a majority of the directors, is insufficient to excuse
demand.”).
364. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2019) (“The certificate of
incorporation or the bylaws may require, consistent with applicable
jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal corporate claims shall be
brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State . . . .”).
365. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559 (Del.
2014). The only procedural rule that is expressly off the table are those that
require the losing party to pay their opponents’ legal fees. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 109(b) (2019).
366. See Matheson, supra note 29, at 363 (noting a director may be
interested “if the director was dominated by a shareholder or director who is
a defendant”).
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structural bias. 367 Even if a board can articulate a proper
purpose for its actions, it is still quite possible that the board
was also motivated by the desire to protect itself from future
litigation, whether consciously or not. 368 A board can easily
claim that its goal was to prevent frivolous suits or better screen
claims, without acknowledging that they would be the
defendants in these hypothetical future suits. 369 This standard
therefore creates a litigation fight at the start of these suits
without ever acknowledging the more serious concerns. 370
Interestingly, courts have used a different approach when
it comes to the second procedural hurdle in derivative
suits—SLC committees. Rather than only focusing on the
independence of individual SLC members, Delaware courts
have crafted a standard that recognizes the structural bias
inherent in all SLC investigations. 371 In reviewing an SLC
recommendation, Delaware courts typically use an intermediate
form of scrutiny that examines both the committee’s
independence and process, as well as whether it had a
reasonable basis for its recommendation. 372 Even if the
committee meets its burden of proof on these elements, the court
will still go on to apply “its own independent business judgment”

367. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 263 (“[C]orporate boards have wide
latitude to use procedure to police shareholder claims.” (emphasis added)).
368. See id. at 262 (“It goes against human nature to presume that
directors will put the corporation’s interests ahead of their own. As a result,
we should be wary of trusting directors to serve as faithful monitors of the
corporation’s interests, and much less of the legal system more broadly.”).
369. See id. at 264–66 (discussing the conflict of interest which often arises
when corporate boards evaluate derivative claims).
370. See Davis II, supra note 69, at 1323 (“Group membership can be a
powerful force—much more powerful than we might intuitively expect—of
influence on how individuals act in settings that relate the group to
outsiders.”).
371. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 268 (“[Under Zapata,] judges are
supposed to be broader protectors of the corporate interest.”).
372. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 928 (Del.
Ch. 2003) (“In order to prevail on its motion to terminate the Delaware
Derivative Action, the SLC must persuade me that: (1) its members were
independent; (2) that they acted in good faith; and (3) that they had reasonable
bases for their recommendations.”).
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to determine whether the motion should be granted. 373 This
standard expressly acknowledges that complete deference to
nominally independent directors may not be appropriate where
the board is considering claims against fellow directors. 374
Empirical studies have shown that this judicial oversight
matters. 375 In states that adopt a weaker form of scrutiny, SLCs
are more likely to recommend dismissal. 376 Cases in these
jurisdictions also settle for smaller amounts. 377 Moreover, after
the Delaware Court of Chancery increased judicial scrutiny of
SLC decisions, SLCs became less likely to recommend dismissal
of the claims, further suggesting that more stringent review can
blunt the impact of structural bias. 378
Courts might adopt a similar standard of review when it
comes to bylaw amendments that impose new procedural
requirements in merger cases and other types of shareholder
litigation. Given that the directors adopting these bylaw
amendments could be among the defendants in any future suit,
they have an incentive to adopt rules that bar even meritorious

373. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981) (“The
second step is intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the
criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where
corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder
grievance deserving of further consideration in the corporation’s interest.”).
374. See id. at 787
We are not satisfied, however, that acceptance of the ‘business
judgment’ rationale at this stage of derivative litigation is a proper
balancing point. While we admit an analogy with a normal case
respecting board judgment, it seems to us that there is sufficient
risk in the realities of a situation like the one presented in this case
to justify caution beyond adherence to the theory of business
judgment.
375. See Krishnan et al., supra note 259, at 17 (“[S]tronger judicial review
of SLC reports seems more likely to help the plaintiff . . . .”).
376. See id. (“[W]eaker judicial review of [SLC] reports makes it more
likely that defendants will win.”).
377. See id. (“[I]n states with the lowest level of judicial review for SLC
reports, we find that SLCs are most likely to recommend case dismissal, more
likely to have a case dismissed, and least likely to result in a high value
settlement.”).
378. See id. at 16 (discussing the effect of the change of the legal standard
in Delaware).
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claims. 379 Indeed, among the first procedural rules that
corporate boards adopted were fee-shifting bylaws, which
required the losing party in a shareholder suit to pay their
opponent’s attorneys’ fees. 380 Fee-shifting bylaws may make
sense in other contexts, but they are likely a death knell for
merger litigation and other forms of representative litigation
because a shareholder who only stands to gain their pro rata
share of any litigation proceeds would now be on the hook for all
of the costs. 381 In other words, as soon as corporate boards were
given the opportunity to adopt new procedural rules for these
suits, some adopted rules that effectively insulated them from
litigation. 382 And the Delaware courts let them. 383
A better approach would be to recognize the structural bias
that exists when directors adopt procedural rules to govern suits
that may someday be filed against them. An intermediate form
of scrutiny—similar to the standard used to review SLC
decisions—would take this bias into account and allow the
courts to examine the objective reasonableness of any new
procedural rules. 384 The examination should focus on the likely
impact of the rule. Is the rule designed to sort meritorious cases
from meritless ones? Or is it likely to make it more difficult for
all plaintiffs to proceed with their claims, regardless of the
claims’ underlying merit? This objective standard would permit

379. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 273 (“[C]orporate boards and
shareholders have already started to use these [bylaw and charter]
amendments to limit merger litigation.”).
380. See id. (“Several companies similarly adopted fee-shifting bylaws and
charter amendments before they were barred by the Delaware General
Assembly.”).
381. See Griffith, supra note 14, at 29 (“Whatever the effects of a move to
fee-shifting may be in other contexts, it almost certainly will kill shareholder
litigation because it would force representative litigants to bear individual
responsibility for the full cost of an unsuccessful suit.” (emphasis in original)).
382. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 273 (suggesting that the new
procedural rules discouraged the filing of meritless claims).
383. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (changing the law to
prevent fee-shifting provisions in corporate charters and bylaws).
384. See supra notes 371–374 and accompanying text.
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procedural rules that help courts sort representative claims,
while invalidating those that do not. 385
Viewed through this lens, fee-shifting bylaws are obviously
suspect, as they discourage all representative claims. Forum
selection clauses, on the other hand, are likely fine, at least if
they direct claims into a court with a reasonable relationship to
the claims. 386 With these procedural tools, therefore, the
standard mimics what Delaware has already done by statute. 387
This approach, however, could also apply to new types of
procedural rules that future boards might adopt, including
heightened pleading standards, limits on discovery, and new
standing rules. 388 At the same time, it does not require the
plaintiff to unearth evidence that any particular directors
adopted the rule with a nefarious purpose, nor does it impugn
the integrity of particular directors. It simply recognizes that we
all have a natural tendency toward self-interest that, in this
particular context, requires greater oversight by courts. 389
More broadly, this approach would provide a foundation
that future courts can use when deciding whether corporate
boards should have greater power to influence shareholder
lawsuits. It is unlikely that we have seen the last attempt by
corporate boards to gain control over these suits. Rather than
crafting a standard of review anew every time boards take this
step, courts should recognize the familiar themes at play and
use a similar standard. This approach will bring the lost lessons
385. Other scholars have also advocated an intermediate level of scrutiny
for this type of bylaw amendment, although they propose a different test. See,
e.g., Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 235, at 362 (“In our view, a
proportionate and reasonable fee-shifting bylaw that responds to a legitimate
threat to corporate welfare is one that provides for two-way shifting of
reasonable fees for frivolous litigation as determined by a neutral arbiter.”).
386. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch.
2010) (encouraging corporation to include forum selection clauses in their
bylaws and charters).
387. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (banning fee-shifting provisions);
id. at § 115 (authorizing forum selection clauses).
388. See, e.g., Jessica Erickson, Investing in Corporate Procedure, 99 B.U.
L. REV. 1367, 1371–72 (2019) (“The field of civil procedure offers specific
solutions to the problems of agency costs and cost asymmetries seen in
shareholder litigation.”).
389. See supra notes 235–237 and accompanying text.
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of shareholder litigation out of the shadows to benefit future
shareholder lawsuits.
V.

Conclusion

Derivative suits are often viewed as the sleepier cousin of
other, more interesting types of shareholder litigation. As the
parties in merger litigation experimented with new types of
settlements, fled to federal courts, and then pushed back on
board control over these lawsuits, derivative suits stayed largely
in the background. Yet, derivative suits had already survived
many of these same developments. 390 Derivative suits have
their own form of nonmonetary settlements, they have also fled
to federal court, and they are also subject to board review. 391
These changes happened more slowly and received less
attention than in merger litigation, but the changes themselves
are remarkably similar.
These parallels provide lessons in the broader issues facing
shareholder litigation. 392 The recent events in merger litigation
are not unique. Instead, they are more common challenges that
have arisen before and could arise again in other types of
litigation. 393 Recognizing this fact should make courts and
policymakers better prepared if similar issues arise in the
future. Courts could develop, for example, broader rules to
govern nonmonetary settlements, rather than addressing these
settlements on a more ad hoc basis in different types of
litigation. 394 They could also face more directly the challenges
that inevitably arise when boards of directors have the power to
review claims that may someday be filed against them. 395 By
uncovering the lost lessons of derivative suits, the legal system
will be ready if history repeats itself again.
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